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Abstract
Non-life insurance pricing depends on different costs including claim and business ac-
quisition costs, management expenses and other parameters such as margin for fluc-
tuations in claims experience, expected profits etc. Nevertheless, in a competitive
insurance market environment, company’s premium should respond to changes in the
level of premiums being offered by competitors. In this thesis, two major issues are
being investigated. Primarily, it is explored how a company’s optimal strategy can be
determined in a competitive market and secondly a connection between this strategy
and market’s competition is established. More specifically, two functional equations for
the volume of business are proposed. In the first place, the volume of business func-
tion is related to the past year’s experience, the average premium of the market, the
company’s premium and a stochastic disturbance. Thus, an optimal premium strategy
which maximizes the total expected linear discounted utility of company’s wealth over
a finite time horizon is defined analytically and endogenously.
In the second place, the volume of business function is enriched with company’s rep-
utation, for the first time according to the author’s knowledge. Moreover, the premium
elasticity and reputation elasticity of the volume of business are taking into consider-
ation. Thus, an optimal premium strategy which maximizes the total expected linear
discounted utility of company’s wealth over a finite time horizon is calculated and for
some special cases analytical solutions are presented. Furthermore, an upper bound or
a minimum premium excess strategy is found for a company with positive reputation
and positive premium elasticity of the volume of business.
Thirdly, the calculation of a fair premium in a competitive market is discussed. A
nonlinear premium-reserve (P-R) model is presented and the premium is derived by
minimizing a quadratic performance criterion concerns the present value of the reserve.
The reserve is a stochastic equation, which includes an additive random nonlinear
function of the state, premium and not necessarily Gaussian noise which is indepen-
dently distributed in time, provided only that the mean value and the covariance of
the random function is zero and a quadratic function of the state, premium and other
parameters, respectively. In this quadratic representation of the covariance function,
new parameters are implemented and enriched further the previous linear models, such
i
as the income insurance elasticity of demand, the number of insured and the inflation
in addition to the company’s reputation. Interestingly, for the very first time, the de-
rived optimal premium in a competitive market environment is also depended on the
company’s reserve among the other parameters.
In each chapter numerical applications show the applicability of the proposed models
and their results are further explained and analyzed.
Finally, suggestions for further research and summary of the conclusions complete
the thesis.
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Glossary
{Vk}k∈N: denotes the sequence of the volume of business (or exposure) underwritten
by the insurer in year [k, k+1). This volume may be measured in any meaningful unit,
e.g. number of claims incurred, total man-hours at risk (for workers’ compensation
insurance). In our thesis, we consider the number of claims incurred as the volume of
exposure.
{pik}k∈N: denotes the sequence of the break-even premium in year [k, k + 1), i.e. risk
premium plus expenses per unit exposure.
{pk}k∈N: denotes the sequence of the premium charged by the insurer in year [k, k+1).
This is our control (decision-making) parameter.
{p¯k}k∈N: denotes the sequence of the ”average” premium charged by the market in
year [k, k + 1). We further assume that this process is stochastic, see also [18]. Let
(Ω,F ,P) be the probability space and {p¯k|k = 1, 2, ...} be the sequence of random vari-
ables defined on this probability space.
{wk}k∈N: denotes the sequence of the company’s wealth in year [k, k + 1).
r: denotes the rate of return on equity required by shareholders of the insurer whose
strategy is under consideration. We further assume that this rate is deterministic.
υ: denotes the corresponding discount factor, υ = (1 + r)−1.
{γk}k∈N: denotes the sequence of the reputation’s impact to the volume of business
in year [k, k + 1), and sign(γk) is the sign of this parameter which represents the kind
of impact that reputation has on the company’s volume of business in year [k, k + 1).
{θk}k∈N: denotes the sequence of the set of all other stochastic variables (which are
assumed to be independently distributed in time and not only Gaussian) and it is con-
x
sidered to be relevant to the demand function in year [k, k + 1).
{αk}k∈N: denotes the sequence of the excess return of capital in year [k, k + 1).
{Rk}k∈N: denotes the sequence of the company’s reserve in year [k, k + 1).
{qk}k∈N: denotes the sequence of the present day value factor of a reserve asset in
year [k, k + 1).
{Bk}k∈N: denotes the sequence of the income elasticity of demand concerning insur-
ance contracts in year [k, k + 1).
{Ck}k∈N: denotes the sequence of the inflation rate in year [k, k + 1).
{Mk}k∈N: denotes the sequence of the number of insured in year [k, k + 1).
{Nk}k∈N: denotes the sequence of the financial risk of the market in year [k, k + 1).
{hk}k∈N: denotes the sequence of the consumers’ expectations concerning the premium
in year [k, k + 1).
xi
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
A non-life insurance policy is an agreement between an insurance company and a cus-
tomer - the policyholder - in which the insurance company undertakes to compensate
the customer for certain unpredictable losses during a time period usually six months
or a year, against a fee, the premium. A non-life insurance policy may cover a damage
on a car, house or other property or losses due to bodily injury to the policyholder or
another person (third party liability); for a company, the insurance may cover property
damages, cost for business interruption or health problems for the employees, and more.
By the insurance contract, economic risk is transferred from the policyholder to the
insurer. Due to the law of large numbers, the loss of the insurance company, being
the sum of a large number of comparatively small independent losses, is much more
predictable than that of an individual (in relative terms): the loss should not be too
far from its expected value. This leads us to the generally applied principle that the
premium should be based on the expected (average) loss that is transferred from the
policyholder to the insurer. There must also be a loading for administration costs, cost
of capital, etc.
The need for statistical methods comes from the fact that the expected losses vary
between policies: the accident rate is not the same for all policyholders and once a
claim has occurred, the expected damages vary between policyholders. Most people
would agree that the fire insurance premium for a large villa should be greater than
for a small cottage; that a driver who is more accident-prone should pay more for a car
insurance; or that installing a fire alarm which reduces the claim frequency should give
a discount on the premium. Another crucial factor that a company has to take into
account is market’s competition.
In most countries in the western world, anti-competitive practices are prevented
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from competition laws which in turn are ensured by government regulators. In those
markets, increasing competition does not permit monopoly profits to be earned and
consequently, the gross premium prices for different insurance products are lower, and
if anything there is a wider range of products supplied. In contrast to other jurisdictions
where competition policy is aimed only at maximizing economic efficiency, the compe-
tition policy in the European Union (EU) has another important goal: to facilitate a
common integrated market, which is a primary objective of the EU. In this context,
competition policy gained a quasi-constitutional status, which affects the relationship
between competition and regulation (OECD, 2005)1. For the sake of coherence, in this
part of the introduction, it should be mentioned that the competition laws in the EU
have some similarities with the laws in the United States antitrust; though there are
some key differences. Insurance regulation in the EU also has a community goal aside
from the usual regulation justifications: the creation of a single European insurance
market. One of the main prima facie practice that the European Commission faces in
insurance market, which opposes competition, are agreements between insurers con-
cerning the premiums (OECD, 1998)2. Therefore, the most relevant Article of the EC
Treaty is 81(1)3.
Until the mid 1980s, it was unclear whether the insurance market is subject to the
European competition policy: analogous to the special treatment granted to agriculture
and transportation, and relying on some national regulations that partially exempted
the insurance industry from the application of the competition policy, insurers argued
that the insurance market, due to its special characteristics, should not be subjected to
the competition rules [64]. In 1985 Commission clearly stated that insurance industry
is subject to the competition law, according to its decision of 5 Dec 1984 [O.J. 1985
L35/20]4. Under this framework, the insurer’s union recommends to its members that
they calculate the premiums at certain levels in order to stabilize the market segment.
Of course, there are some further exemptions to these competition laws such as the
premium calculation exemption according to the Regulation of 1992 [Reg.3932/92]5,
which acknowledges the difficulty of an individual insurer to properly assess average
risks and the need to have broad statistical databases. The regulation also exempts
agreements for joint studies regarding claims frequency and scale.
Today, the market has been deregulated in many countries: the legislation has been
1OECD: Relationship between Regulators and Competition Authorities,
http : //www.oecd.org/newsroom/34711139.pdf
2OECD: Relationship between Regulators and Competition Authorities,
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/sectors/1920556.pdf
3European Commission, Competition, Financial Services, Insurance
http : //ec.europa.eu/competition/legislation/treaties/ec/art81en.html
4Official Journal of the EC, Commission Decision
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1985:035:FULL:EN:PDF
5Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3932/92
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1992:398:0007:0014:EN:PDF
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modified to ensure free competition rather than uniform pricing. The idea is that if an
insurance company charges too high a premium for some policies, these will be lost to
a competitor with a more fair premium. Suppose that a company charges too little for
young drivers and too much for old drivers; then they will tend to loose old drivers to
competitors while attracting young drivers; this adverse selection will result in economic
loss both ways: by loosing profitable and gaining underpriced policies. Therefore, on
a competitive market it is advantageous to charge a fair premium, if by fairness we
mean that each policyholder, as far as possible, pays a premium that corresponds to
the expected losses transferred to the insurance company.
Subsequently, the premium pricing process for non-life products is always a very
challenging task in the insurance industry as the actuarial team needs to consider the
various characteristics of the insured object, the potential demand from the policy
holders, the available information about the competition of the targeted market, com-
pany’s wealth and the reserve that must be kept. Thus, the main data source on which
premium strategy is formulated is not only based on the insurance company’s own his-
torical data on policies and claims, but also supplementary information from external
sources. At last but not least, it should be emphasized that every company’s objective
is either to maximize its wealth or to minimize the level of the required reserve.
An usual approach concerning non-life insurance pricing is the use of Generalized
Linear Models (GLM). A number of key ratios are dependent on a set of rating factors;
see [60]. For personal lines insurance which are designed to be sold in large quantities,
the key ratios are often claim frequency and severity (cost per claim), while for commer-
cial lines insurance which are designed for relatively small legal entities, the loss ratio
may be also considered (claim costs per earned premium). Rating factors are grouped
into classes (i.e. factor variables) and may include information about policyholder, the
insured risk as well as geographic and demographic information.
In real world actuarial applications, a premium principle connects the cost of a
general insurance policy to the moments of the corresponding claim arrival and severity
distributions. Insurers add a loading to this cost price in order to make profit and cover
their expenses. After this consideration, two main questions are raised; ”how an optimal
premium can be calculated in order to maximize company’s wealth or minimize the level
of the required reserve?” and ”how it is possible to find a premium strategy that takes
into consideration market’s competition and all the different economic parameters that
affect company’s wealth or reserve except for the cost of a general insurance policy?”.
1.2 Developments in the Competitive Insurance Markets
It is generally admitted that many lines of insurance are highly competitive and as a
result in the real world insurance applications, the loading depends critically on the
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price that other insurers charge for comparable policies. Clapp [11] demonstrates that
insurance firms are able to use the quantity of insurance to compete for customers.
By changing the level of indemnity while holding the premium rate constant (quantity
competition), it is possible to induce customers to reveal their risk class. In [67],
a competitive equilibrium may not exist and when this exists it may have strange
properties.
The daily change in the exposure of a non-life insurer increases as policies are sold
and decreases as policies are not renewed or canceled. In a highly competitive price-
conscious market the insurer’s premium relative to the rest of the insurance market
is an important factor in policy sales. The size of the insurer as measured by its
current exposure is also important, since larger insurers tend to attract greater volume
of business than small insurers with comparable premium rates. However, there are
many other factors which influence demand: the marketing of the policies, the need for
insurance, the reputation of the insurer and the capacity of the insurer to underwrite
policies. These factors are too numerous to incorporate into a simple non-life insurance
model and they are hard to quantify, yet they all contribute to the uncertainty in how
much exposure a given pricing strategy will generate.
There is little insurance literature on modeling how insurance premiums should be
determined in a competitive market and how they respond to changes in the levels of
premiums being offered by competitor companies.
Taylor [71] mentions that in the Australian insurance market and particularly the
liability section of it, has been characterized by violent changes in premium rate. During
these fluctuations in premium rates the various operators in the market appeared to
act in a similar manner; generally, these individual operators followed the market as
its average premium rates declined and then increased.
From the viewpoint of rational product pricing, this cyclical behavior of premium
rates seems peculiar and raises questions. For instance ”what the market was attempting
to achieve by such pricing” and ”what individual insurers were attempting to achieve
in following the market”.
Analytically, he explores successfully the relation between the market’s behaviour
and the optimal response of an individual insurer, whose objective is to maximize the
expected present value of the wealth arising over a predefined finite time horizon. He
also assumes that the insurance products display a positive price-elasticity of demand.
Thus, if the market as a whole begins underwriting at a loss, any attempt by a particular
insurer to maintain profitability will result in a reduction of its volume of business.
Following his ideas, for a given sequence of average market prices over fixed years to
the planning horizon, the demand function fk(.) is given by a relation of the following
type
4
qj = fj(pj , pj , qj−1, θ), (1.1)
and the objective function requiring maximization is equal to
E =
J∑
j=1
υj−
1
2 qj (pj − pij) , (1.2)
where qj denotes the volume of exposure underwritten by the insurer in year j, pij
denotes the break-even premium rate (per unit exposure), pj denotes the premium
rate (per unit exposure) charged by the insurer in year j, pj denotes market’s average
premium, θ denotes the set of all other variables considered to be relevant to the
demand function and υ denotes the corresponding discount factor, (1 + r)−1. Clearly
the previous demand function is far too general for any useful results to be derived.
Thus, Taylor restrict it to the following
fj(pj , pj , qj−1, θ) = qj−1f(pj , pj). (1.3)
In addition implicit in this restriction of the demand function are several assumptions:
• the demand function is stationary over time, and hence the subscript in fj has
been dropped;
• demand in year j is assumed to be proportional to demand in the preceding year;
• the discarding of the unspecified set of variables amounts effectively to treating
the sequence of market rates pj , as given, exogenous to the strategy of the insurer
under consideration.
The objective function which is maximized after assumptions and calculations is equal
to
E =
J∑
j=1
υj(pj − pij)
[
j∏
k=1
f (pk, p¯k)
]
. (1.4)
In order to find an optimal solution Taylor [71] defines
g(pk) = log f (pk, p¯k) , (1.5)
where the function g
′
(p) maybe related to the price-elasticity of demand.
He comes up to some very interesting results. Firstly, he shows that as the rate
of discount of future profits increases, the projected future premium rates involved in
the optimal underwriting strategy also increases. Moreover if this rate of discount is
sufficiently large, then the optimal strategy will never involve any loss leaders, i.e.,
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cases in which the average premium at which underwriting is conducted is less than
the break-even premium. As price elasticity is reduced, the penalties (in loss of volume
of exposure) due to high premium rates, or the gains due to low premium rates, are
reduced. It is intuitive then that the strategy of optimal profitability will involve higher
premium rates.
Moreover some special demand functions are studied. One of them is the negative
exponential demand function in which
f (pk, p¯k) = exp−a (pk − p¯k)/p¯k, (1.6)
for some constant a > 0 which corresponds to a price elasticity which increases linearly
with price. Secondly, the constant price elasticity is studied where
f (pk, p¯k) = (pk/p¯k)
−a, (1.7)
for some constant a > 0. Finally, a demand function which prohibits loss leaders is
investigated. This demand function satisfies the conditions
∣∣∣∣[g′ (p)]−1 exp g (p)∣∣∣∣ < K
and
∣∣∣g′ (p)∣∣∣ < 1/υK for K > 0 at least over a limited range of p.
According to his results [71] the optimal strategies do not follow what someone might
expect. For instance, it is not the case that profitability is best served by following the
market during a period of premium rate depression. In particular, the optimal strategy
may well involve underwriting for important profit margins at times when the average
market premium rate is well short of breaking even. Therefore, he states that the
optimal response depends upon various factors including:
• the predicted time which will elapse before a return of market rates into prof-
itability,
• the price elasticity of demand for the insurance product under consideration and
• the rate of return required on the capital supporting the insurance operation.
In particular, it is seen that the optimal strategy may well involve underwritting for
significant profit margins at times when the average market premium rate is well short
of breaking even. On the other hand, conditions can arise in which the optimal pre-
mium rating strategy will indicate loss leading in the near future. As a very broad
generalization, this may be the case when the current average market rate lies below
the break-even rate, but is expected to return to substantial profitability in the very
near future. Optimal strategies will not involve loss leaders, irrespective of the degree of
competition from the market, if the demand function for the insurance product assumes
certain forms. These particular forms are not unrealistic. It follows that some market
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research on the shape of the demand function may assist an insurer seeking to deter-
mine a suitable underwriting strategy. In summary, it appears that the longer term
profitability of an insurer will only comparatively rarely be best served by underwriting
for deliberate losses.
Taylor in his next paper [72] notes that optimum underwriting strategies might be
substantially affected by the proper marginal expense rates which must be taken into
account. It is first noted that the optimal strategy is not affected by the introduction
of a component of fixed expenses, irrespective of the size of that component. However,
the strategy will be affected if the concomitant of the introduction of fixed expenses is
the recognition of lower marginal expenses. It is possible to set limits on the effect of
expenses on optimal underwriting strategy. The sharpness of these limits depends on:
• the extent of variation in marginal expense rates as demand varies;
• the price-elasticity of demand.
The case in which the marginal expense rate is constant and price-elasticity is directly
proportional with price is a simple one. In this case, the optimal premium rates tak-
ing expenses into account are precisely equal to the optimal premium rates ignoring
expenses, increased by the marginal expense rate.
As these two factors depart from this particular case, the behaviour of optimal
premium rates with expenses taken properly into account becomes less predictable
relative to the optimal rates ignoring expenses. Some empirical results have been
examined and it is found that the general shape of the optimal strategy, in terms of
the optimal premium rate as a function of time measured between the present and
the planning time horizon, is to a large extent unaffected by whether they incorporate
proper allowance for (possibly varying) marginal expenses or approximate these by
assumed constant unit expenses. The general level of optimal premiums may, however,
be shifted to a material extent by the proper recognition of expenses. It is also found
that in examples in which the assumption of constant unit expense rates leads to optimal
premium rates of substantial negative profitability. the adjustment to reflect marginal
expenses properly can cause very significant changes to these low premium rates.
Emms and Haberman [17] extend significantly Taylor’s ideas [71, 72] considering
the continuous form of his model and more specific
dq = qg(p/p¯)dt (1.8)
and
dw = −αwdt+ q (p− pi) dt, (1.9)
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where q is the insurer’s exposure at time t, the insurer’s premium (per unit exposure)
is p, the market’s average premium (per unit exposure) is p¯, the wealth process is w
and the mean claim size (per unit exposure) is pi. The demand function is exp(g) and
α represents the loss of wealth due to returns paid to shareholders. Emms et al. [17]
assume that p¯ is a positive random process with finite mean at time t and leave the
distribution for the mean claim size process pi unspecified. With this formulation w is
an accurate reflection of the wealth of the company at time t since each policyholder
pays a premium pdt per unit exposure for each dt of cover. Consequently there are no
outstanding liabilities at the end of the planning horizon T .
The principal assumption of this model is that all new and existing policyholders
are required to pay the current premium rate p. The change in wealth at time t due
to premium income is denoted by the term pqdt in the wealth equation. Such an
assumption is attractive since it means that all the random processes are Markov. The
objective function is
V = max
p
{E [w (T ) /S (0)]} , (1.10)
that is maximising the expected wealth at the end of the planning horizon T given
information on the state S at time t = 0. The control variable is k and the state
variable is the exposure q which is governed by
q˙ = qg (k) . (1.11)
For both the constant elasticity and exponential demand functions of g is a decreasing
function of k. Their model is modified in a number of ways. Firstly, they suppose
that the loss ratio γ = pi/p¯ is constant. If the break-even premium rate is constant
this complicates the behavior of the optimal control. Specifically, if the market aver-
age premium drifts above breakeven the optimal control is necessarily a loss leader.
However, one would expect the main reason for greater premiums is that claims are
higher so that there is a direct correlation between the market average premium and
the expected mean claim size (or breakeven premium rate). Secondly, they generalise
the deterministic premium strategy to be of the form p/p¯ = k (t). In an unconstrained
model they find that the optimal control k(t) is bang-bang. This is a direct consequence
of the assumption that the insurer can force existing customers to pay the current pre-
mium rate. The optimal control strongly depends on how much the insurer can raise
the premium rate during the course of a policy. They are led to a modification of the
model which fixes the premium rate at the start of a policyholder’s contract. For two
choices of the demand function a smooth optimal control is calculated. They find that
withdrawal from the market, setting a premium above break-even or loss-leading can be
optimal and that the qualitative form of optimal premium strategy is sensitive to the
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form of the demand function. A loss-leading premium strategy is optimal for a linear
demand function when the loss ratio is sufficiently small or the mean contract length
is sufficiently large. If one adopts a parameterisation which increases the demand for
insurance with a high relative premium then this leads to an unsmooth optimal control
with a high terminal premium rate.
The premium strategy of loss-leading followed by profit-taking is one possible cause
of the observed actuarial cycle. Many insurance companies prohibit loss-leading which
imposes a restriction on the premium charged to policyholders. However, using optimal
control theory the requirement becomes a constraint on the relative premium and may
lead to a non-smooth control. Deterministic premium strategies can be investigated
numerically for a variety of constrains including those which involve the state of the
insurer. Moreover the authors compare the optimal deterministic strategies for linear
demand function with the dynamic premium strategy predicted by Bellman equation.
If the market average premium rate is modelled as a log-normal process they find that
the deterministic premium strategy and dynamic premium are of the same form.
Emms et al. [18] model market’s average premium as a geometric Brownian motion
dp¯
p¯
= µdt+ σdZ, (1.12)
where Z is a Wiener process and the drift µ and the volatility σ are assumed to be
constant. The future market average premium is lognormally distributed (and hence
positive) ie.
log p¯ (t) ∼ N
(
log p¯0 +
(
µ− 1
2
σ2
)
t, σ2t
)
. (1.13)
They define the demand process by
qk+1 = f (pk+1, p¯k+1) qk. (1.14)
Therefore, the demand process is described by
dq
q
= log f (p, p¯) dt, (1.15)
where p := p (p¯, pi, t) is the premium at time t. The wealth follows the stochastic process
given by
dw = −αwdt+ q(p− pi)dt, (1.16)
where α is the excess return on capital (i.e. return on capital risk free rate) required
by the shareholders of the insurer whose strategy is under consideration. Thus, is the
cost of holding w in a small time interval dt. The aim is, for a given utility function of
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wealth U(w, t) to define the value function
V := max
{
J = E
∫ T
0
U (w(s), s) ds
}
, (1.17)
as the maximisation of the objective function J over a choice of strategies p. This is
similar to the objective function used by Taylor [71] with profit replaced by total wealth
at time T . Moreover, the authors consider two different choices of demand functions;
the exponential demand function where
f(p, p¯) = exp
[−a(p− p¯)
p¯
]
, (1.18)
for some constant α > 0 and the constant elasticity demand function where
f(p, p¯) =
(
p
p¯
)−a
, (1.19)
and the utility function is equal to
U(w, t) = e−βtw, (1.20)
where β is the intertemporal discount rate.
They study two premium strategies. The first one is to set a premium of the form
p(t) = kp¯(t), (1.21)
where k is constant. Thus, they assume that the premium set by the insurer is a linear
function of the market average premium and calculate the objective function for a range
of values of k. In this premium strategy and under the condition that α = µ = 0 the
approximate optimal strategy is k∗ = γ = pip¯(0) . Consequently the optimal premium
strategy has two modes depending on the model parameters: either set an infinite
premium and accumulate wealth from the existing customer base or set the premium
at just above breakeven in order to maximize market exposure whilst at the same time
making a profit. The existence of a finite optimal premium strategy for γ < 1 arises
from two competing forces: the desire to set as low a premium as possible in order to
gain new business, and the requirement to generate a profit by setting a high premium.
In reality, an infinite premium rate will correspond to not selling insurance at all since
no-one will buy insurance at such a price. In this premium strategy and under the
condition that α = 0 and µ 6= 0 the optimal strategy is to keep the expected premium
value near the break-even premium value at t = T .
The second premium strategy is setting a premium policy p as a function of the
break-even premium pi and the difference of the market average premium p¯ and the
break-even premium :
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p(t) = pi + r(p¯(t)− pi), (1.22)
and hense they optimise over the single parameter r.
For µ = σ = 0 there are two models for the optimal strategy p = ∞ or r∗ ≈ 0.
For α = β = 0 the optimal strategy is p∗ = pi + εp¯ (0). For α = β = σ = 0 as the
drift of the market average premium increases the optimal value r∗ decreases. This
behaviour is consistent with the idea that the optimal strategy is to aim for a large
terminal exposure rather than a large profit per policyholder. By keeping the terminal
premium relatively small, then pp¯ is small and so the exposure is large. As ε becomes
very small then the optimal premium strategy is to set a premium just above the break-
even premium. Moreover the variation of r∗ is no longer linear with γ but increases
only gradually.
Consequently, they investigate optimal strategies for two particular approaches to
fixing the premium. The first approach is based on a linear function of the market
average premium, while the second involves a linear combination of the break-even
premium and the market average premium.
The qualitative behaviour of the optimal strategy in the first case is determined
analytically. Thus, if the market average premium is drift-less, they demonstrate that
there are two optimal strategy modes: setting an infinite premium rate when the initial
market average premium rate is below the break-even premium or setting the premium
rate a fraction above the break-even premium when the market is underwriting at
a profit. If the market average premium has upward drift then there are again two
optimal strategies: an infinite premium rate or a loss-leading strategy which makes an
initial loss but gains market exposure. If the market average premium has negative
drift then a non-infinite optimal strategy can exist whereby the insurer sets a premium
just above the market mean. This can generate enough initial wealth to offset the loss
as the market average premium drifts below break-even. The important parameters
which determine the optimal strategy is:
• γ the ratio of initial market average premium to break-even premium,
•  a measure of the inverse elasticity of the demand function, and
• ν the nondimensional drift of the market average premium.
The optimal form of the strategy in the second case is similar except that the drift of
the market average premium does not have such a pronounced effect on the optimal
strategy. Loss leading is much less likely with this form of strategy. The second
strategy is also affected by the volatility of the market average premium. However,
the qualitative form of the optimal strategy remains the same. As the volatility of the
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market average premium increases so does the wealth generated by choosing an optimal
strategy.
Emms [19] determines the optimal strategy for an insurer which maximizes a par-
ticular objective over a fixed planning horizon and the premium by using a competitive
demand model as well as the expected main claim size. Consequently, he supposes that
the premium is partially determined by the price relative to the rest of the insurance
market. According to this paper, it is not enough that an insurer set a price to cover
claims if the rest of the market undercuts that price. Additionally, the demand law
specifies how the insurer’s income and exposure change with the relative to market
premium; a low relative premium generates exposure but leads to reduced premium
income.
A two factor model of the general insurance market is proposed; one factor models
the randomness of the claim size and intensity, whilst the other models the market
average premium. This model is used to to determine the premium which maximizes
a number of possible objective functions of the insurer. In his paper the derivation of
the Bellman equation is described, which gives the optimal dynamic premium strategy
to maximize the expected terminal wealth of the insurer. The problem reduces to the
solution of a reaction-diffusion equation, which is straightforward to solve numerically.
In addition, he considers the objective of maximizing the expected total discounted
utility of wealth with a utility function linear in wealth which is assumed to be a
more realistic objective for the insurer given the regulatory constrains imposed over
the course of the planning horizon. The resulting reaction-diffusion equation is more
complex but can be solved straightforward.
In [19] the author introduces the relative loss ratio which is defined as the ratio
between the breakeven premium of the insurer and the markets average premium γt =
pit
p¯t
. The breakeven premium is the random amount a policy of length τ costs the
insurance company. This is the actuarial premium without any profit margin and can
be deduced form the insurer’s previous claims data and a loading factor to account
for expenses and interest rates [14]. In this paper, he supposes that the breakeven
premium is a stochastic process. The advantage of this formulation is that there are no
outstanding liabilities at the end of the planning horizon T because as soon as policies
of total exposure δqt are bought, the insurer sets aside pitδqt to cover the resulting
claims.
In a few words, the optimal premium strategy for an insurer in a competitive market
using optimal control theory is found. In general, the Bellman equation arising from
control theory contains a degenerate diffusion operator. For that model the author
shows how this degeneracy can be removed by a change of variables, which makes the
resulting problems easy to solve numerically. The choice of a linear demand function (in
the relative premium) leads to a single non linear term in the Bellman equation which
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considerably simplifies the analysis. As a result, the ability to find the optimal premium
strategy is limited by the values given to the model parameters. In general, according
to this study, if the optimal control is smooth then the optimal premium gradually
increases over the term of the planning horizon for the parameters sets considered
there. In addition, as risk aversion is increased so does the optimal relative premium
strategy. This generates lower exposure and so ultimately lower overall wealth.
One significant assumption is that the market is treated distinctly from the insurer
so that whatever the insurer’s premium, the market does not react with a competitive
price. Another modeling specification is that of the stochastic process for the breakeven
premium which represents the cost of insurance for the insurer and assessment of this
quantity requires a good model for the claim process and an accurate definition of the
loading factor. The benefit of using this process to define a loss-ratio is that the wealth
process directly reflects the current wealth of the insurer including liabilities.
Emms again [20] studies optimal premium pricing into a competitive market with
constrains. Analytically, he calculates the premium strategy which maximises the ob-
jective of the insurer subject to a constrain on the control or constrains on the reserve
that the insurer must hold. Since the model is very simple an analytical solution can
be found if the relative premium is bounded. Depending on the parameter values of the
model this can lead to a non-smooth control. Specifically, a ”Type 1” control represents
a loss-leading strategy and the greater the loss-leading, the more likely the insurer ex-
ceeds its lower bound on the relative premium. It is shown that the premium strategy
kt = k (t) is the optimal relative premium if the mean claim rate process is lognormal.
For other distributions of the mean claim rate process the feedback control depends on
the current value of the state variables and so it is a stochastic process. If there are
no constrains then the theory in Fleming and Rishel [26] for stochastic optimisation
problems can be employed.
When the insurer constrains the premium strategy, the optimal control can be
non-smooth. This makes it much more difficult to obtain stochastic optimal premium
strategies from the HJB equation because that equations are expected to have non-
smooth solutions. Consequently, he restricts the feasible controls to be deterministic,
which turns the problem into a deterministic optimisation problem even though the
actual premium charged is stochastic. The resulting optimisation problem is been
demostrated to be readily solved using control parameterisation. This is a general
technique and allows the insurer to calculate optimal strategies for any reasonable
objective or demands functions. It also permits the imposition of an arbitary number
of constrains without substantially increasing the computational time.
Premium restrictions lead to control constrains, while solvency requirements lead to
state constrains. A control constrain can be used to prevent negative optimal premium
values. The numerical problems show that the state constraints limit the ammount
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of loss-leading that the insurer may experience with an optimal premium strategy.
Further studies are concentrated on relaxing some of the assumptions of the model.
Specifically, author parameterises the delay in the exposure equation. If one forgoes
this assumption then the state equations become a system of stochastic delay differential
equations. By assuming a deterministic control the optimisation problem can again be
solved by control parameterisation [73]. However, in this case is needed to specify the
initial curves for the state variables in order to accommodate the delay in state.
The author calculates the unconstrained optimal premium strategy numerically
form the HJB equation. It is found that the optimal strategy is only weekly dependent
on the volatility of the market average premium. This is because the control does not
directly scale the Brownian motion in the state equations. One can view the stochastic
pricing problem as a perturbed version of the deterministic model. Consequently, it
is expected that the constrained stochastic model to have a similar optimal premium
strategy to the constrained deterministic model.
Emms [23] introduces a simple parameterisation which represents the insurance
market’s response to an insurer adopting a pricing strategy determined via optimal
control theory and claims are modeled using a lognormally distributed mean claim size
rate. Analytically, a generalisation of the demand function which is mentioned in [20] is
taken place which impacts significantly on the optimal premium strategy for an insurer.
If there is no reaction in the market, then they find an analytical expression for the
optimal relative premium, and if there is no insurance claims, then the optimal relative
premium is zero, since there is no need for insurance. Even though the optimal premium
strategy is given explicitly, it is not immediately apparent from the analytical solution
how the demand function affects the optimal strategy. Consequently, he introduces a
set of parameters and considered the deviation of the optimal strategy corresponding to
changes in the parameter set. As the sensitivity of the market to the value of insurance
is decreased, demand for insurance increases, and the optimal strategy can lead to
negative premium values if the markets overprice insurance.
If the market reacts to an insurer who uses optimal control theory in order to
calculate premium values, then only a numerical solution can be found for the optimal
control problem, with an exit set determined as part of the optimisation problem. In
addition, the numerical solution is not entirely straightforward, because the state space
is separated into two regions: one where it is optimal for the insurer to leave the market,
and the other where the Bellman equation yields the optimal premium strategy. The
author fixes the boundary of these two regions by introducing a front-fixing coordinate
transformation, which makes the Bellman equation more complicated.
Three numerical schemes are implemented, and they agree on the computed value
function as the mesh is refined. This according to the author is indicative that they
have a robust solution to the Bellman equation, and that the feedback law does yield an
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optimal control under parametric restrictions. The more implicit the numerical scheme,
the more computational effort is required to solve the numerical problem. However, the
fully implicit scheme allows a larger time step without introducing numerical stability.
For these problems, the reduction in time step required by the explicit scheme is more
than compensated for by its faster overall execution time.
If one changes the parameters far from the base set, all the numerical schemes show
numerical instability. It is clear from the analytical solution that the value function is
singular as the sensitivity of the demand function to the market loading is decreased,
which means that infinite wealth can be generated. With market reaction, the demand
function needs to be changed in order to prevent collusion. According to the author,
the numerical instability indicates that the value function is singular over part of the
domain.
If the insurer sets its premium sufficiently below the market average, then its ex-
posure grows exponentially, and this growth continues indefinitely. In reality, there is
a lower-bound on the insurer’s reserve and a finite market for insurance policies. The
constrained stochastic optimisation problem is formidable, since it is likely that there
are no smooth solutions to the Bellman equation. Calculation of the maximum in the
Bellman equation at each time step might lead to a more robust numerical scheme
for the constrained problem. The exponential growth in exposure can be removed by
introducing a saturation exposure and this may also decrease the numerical sensitivity
of the optimisation problem.
Emms and Haberman [22] describe a general determinist model for pricing general
insurance using optimal control theory. The theory encompasses different parametriza-
tion of the demand for policies and different objectives for the insurer. Any model
tackled via control theory becomes more difficult to analyze as one increases the num-
ber of state variables to accurately model the underlying process. They focus on how
the optimization problem is simplified as the assumptions of the model are changed.
The simplest problem, that of an insurer in an infinite market with a terminal
wealth objective requires only backwards integration of the adjoin variable of the ex-
posure. This has an explicit analytical solution if the price function is linear. They
also find an implicit analytical solution for a non linear price function, although for this
parametrization there is no cutoff in relative premium beyond which there is no demand
for insurance. Thus, it becomes difficult to classify the optimal strategy because it is
always optimal to sell insurance policies.
When the market is finite, the simplest optimization problem becomes a boundary
value problem, where the exposure is integrated forwards in time, and simultaneously
the adjoint of the exposure is integrated backwards. No analytical solutions have been
found in this case. However, by analyzing the phase diagram of the state/adjoint
system, they explore the optimal strategies for the insurer and find that premium
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strategies vary according to the equilibrium point(s) in the phase diagram, and that
these points are always unstable saddle points over the parameter set of interest. The
type of the optimal strategy can be classified according to in which quadrant of the
saddle the insurer lies as given by its initial exposure and the position of the equilibrium
point. For example, one quadrant corresponds to a loss-leading strategy where it is
optimal to set an increasing premium and build up exposure if the insurer is particularly
small. For the terminal wealth problem, there is an explicit expression for the position
of the equilibrium point.
The demand function is the parameterization that most affects the optimal premium
strategy. They are certain restrictions on the form of the demand function: most
notably we require gg
′′
< 2g
′2 , where g is the price function, in order that the first-
order condition of the Hamiltonian gives a maximum. This is analogous result to that
given by Taylor [71] and Kalish [42].
In an infinite market, the optimal premium strategy for the total wealth objective
depends on the current size of the insurer if the utility function is nonlinear. The
nonlinearity of the concave utility function means that low wealth is relative more
favorable over high wealth, and this affects the premium strategy of a relative large
insurer where the insurer is close to its saturation exposure. If the demand function is
concave indicating lower demand for a given relative premium ratio, then that favors
market withdrawal over a loss-leading strategy. Similarly, convex demand functions
push the equilibrium point in the phase diagram toward the region of withdrawal so
that loss-leading is favored.
1.3 Extending the existing literature - The new approaches
Taylor [71, 72] and Emms et al. [17, 18] study fixed premium strategies and the
sensitivity of the model to its parameters involved. In their approach, the important
parameters which determined the optimal strategies are the ratio of initial market
average premium to break-even premium, the measure of the inverse elasticity of the
demand function and the non-dimensional drift of the market average premium.
In chapter 2 we introduce a stochastic demand function for the volume of business
of an insurance company into a discrete-time extending further Taylor’s ideas [71, 72].
Additionally, using a linear discounted function for the wealth process of the company,
as [18] have considered, we provide an analytical (endogenous) formula for the optimal
premium strategy of the insurance company when it is expected to lose part of the
market. Mathematically speaking, we create a maximization problem for the wealth
process of a company, which has been solved using stochastic dynamic programming.
Thus, the optimal controller (i.e. the premium) is defined endogenously by the market
as the company struggles to increase its volume of business into a competitive environ-
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ment with the same characteristics as Taylor [71, 72], Emms and Haberman [17], and
Emms et al. [17, 18] have used. Finally, we consider three different strategies for the
average premium of the market, and the optimal premium policy is derived and fully
investigated. The results of this chapter are further evaluated by using data from the
Greek Automobile Insurance Industry. Analytically, in sections 2.3 and 2.4 a discrete-
time model for the insurance market is constructed. We discuss appropriate values
for the model parameters and adopt suitable parameterizations. The next section 2.5
considers each strategy in turn and presents numerical applications: we find analytical
forms for the optimal strategies. In Premium Strategy I, the average premium of the
market is calculated considering all the competitors of the market, and their propor-
tions regarding the volume of business. In Premium Strategy II, the average premium
of market is calculated considering the top 5 competitors of the market. Finally, in
Premium Strategy III the average premium of the market is calculated considering
company’s direct competitors.
In chapter 3, the volume of business is formed to be a general stochastic demand
function extending further chapter’s 2 suggestions making the model more pragmatic
and realistic. Thus, here for the very first time according to the author’s knowledge, for
the formulation of the volume of business, the company’s reputation is also considered.
According to [12], company’s reputation (or corporate reputation) has a strong influence
on buying decisions or in other words, on the demand of the company’s product. So,
in our case the function for the volume of business emphasizes the ratio of the markets
average to the company’s premium, the past year experience, the company’s reputation
and a stochastic disturbance. Additionally, following the existing literature, the same
linear discounted function for the wealth process of the company is used, see also [18]
and chapter 2. Moreover, the optimal premium can be calculated for either negative or
positive affection of the company’s reputation; something that was not possible with
the previous model, see chapter 2.
As in [18], [71, 72] the volume of business is directly connected to the company’s
product demand function. Market’s demand for an insurance product is the relation-
ship between the product’s price and the product demanded by all customers. In our
case, the volume of business function is derived from the equilibrium points of the
competitive market (perfect competition) which are defined by the intersection of the
demand and supply curves. These points determine the contracts of general insurance
that purchased, and its’ prices, which are equal to the marginal cost of services. Gen-
erally, an approach to competitive behavior examines the revenue and cost structure
of companies, using the framework of perfect competition as the reference position.
Insurance firms operating under conditions of perfect competition are unable to absorb
any of the cost increase. They are forced to pass on the entire rise of input costs on
output prices and revenue, leaving output unaffected. By contrast, under monopolistic
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conditions in equilibrium, a rise in input prices, such as wages or administrative costs,
results in a reduction in output and a rise in price by a smaller amount than increase
in costs, leading to shrinking of total revenue. Thus, marginally profitable firms may
have to leave the industry. Moreover the insurance contracts are homogenous, cus-
tomers face no quality differences, the transaction costs are zero and there are perfect
information of customers and insurance companies.
In addition in chapter 3 we present the analytical solutions for some common special
cases and a premium strategy concerning market’s average premium. Moreover we
present the stability conditions for the wealth function and for the optimal strategy
and an application.
In detail, the third chapter is organized as follows: In sections 3.3 and 3.4 a discrete-
time model for the insurance market is constructed. We discuss appropriate values for
the model’s parameters and adopt suitable parameterizations. Moreover, in 3.4 section
the calculation of the optimal premium and the two main theorems are presented,
both when the expected utility is being maximized and minimized. Therefore, for
some special cases analytical forms for the optimal strategy are appeared. Section
3.5 considers an application data’s presentation and analysis and a premium strategy
regarding market’s average premium.
In chapter 4 we focus on finding an optimal premium which minimizes company’s
reserve. The premium-reserve (P-R) process for non-life products is always a very
challenging task in the insurance industry as the actuarial team needs to consider the
various characteristics of the insured object, the potential demand from the policy
holders, the available information about the competition of the targeted market and
the reserve that must be kept. Thus, the main data source on which premium strategy
is formulated is not only based on the insurance company’s own historical data on
policies and claims, but also supplementary information from external sources. At last
but not least, it should be emphasised that every company’s objective is to minimize
the level of the required reserve. Consequently, the main challenge that a company
faces is to set a fair premium that comes up from a reserve minimization procedure
which takes into account different actuarial and financial parameters as well as the
market’s competition.
In this thesis the disturbance of the volume of business function denotes the set of
all other stochastic variables that are considered to be relevant to the demand function
(moreover, they are assumed to be independently distributed in time and Gaussian).
However, this significant function should also be consisted by many other micro-macro
economic factors that affect the company’s volume of business and consequently, the
optimal premium strategy. Thus, a more thoughtful analysis of this real world in-
surance problem demands that the volume of business to be modelled as a nonlinear
function with respect to reserve, the premium, the noise and a quadratic performance
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criterion concerning the utility function to be implemented. Indeed, there are quite
a few examples that nonlinear analysis to model different insurance’s applications is
required, see for instance [47, 48] and [25].
In this part of the introduction, let us continue with some arguments about the
choice of a quadratic minimization problem. Indeed, quadratic forms are the next
simplest functions after linear ones. Like linear functions, they have a matrix repre-
sentation, so that studying quadratic forms reduces to studying symmetric matrices.
Additionally, the second order condition that distinguish maxima from minima in eco-
nomic optimization problems are stated in terms of a quadratic form. It should be
mentioned that several well known economic problems are modelled using quadratic
objective functions, such as the risk minimization problems in finance, where riski-
ness is measured by the (quadratic) variance of the returns from investments etc.; see
[70, 69]. Concerning insurance’s application, Lai [52] uses a quadratic utility function
to find the sufficient conditions on the insurance premium and deductible to increase
the production for a risk-averse firm.
Giving another dimension to the models presented in chapters 2 and 3, in chapter
4 the volume of business in year k is not only proportional to the ratio of the mar-
ket’s average and company’s premium, but it is also related to a function of the form
fk(Rk, p˜k, θk), where Fk(Rk, p˜k)
∆
= E[f2k (Rk, p˜k, θk)]. As it will be clearer in Chapter 4,
the function Fk(Rk, p˜k) consists of micro-macro economic parameters which, are im-
plemented in a competitive P-R model. These are the income insurance elasticity of
demand, the numbers of insured and the inflation in addition to the fame of company.
Since, it is not straightforward to define completely the function fk(Rk, p˜k, θk) because
of its stochastic property, a rational approach is given by the function Fk(Rk, p˜k).
Thus, the main contribution of this chapter can be highlighted on the following key
points. First, an optimal quadratic control model for the determination of the P-R
strategy is developed as a minimization problem in a nonlinear framework for the very
first time according to the authors’ knowledge. In this approach, the present value of
the company’s reserve is required to be close to zero. Second, the stochastic function
fk(Rk, p˜k, θk) that affects the company’s reserve is analysed considering different micro-
macro economic parameters, which directly or indirectly affect the optimal premium.
Finally, as in [61, 62], the insurance premium is given dynamically and includes a good
number of interesting and very informative parameters about the competition of the
market.
Chapter 4 is organized as follows: In section 4.3 , a nonlinear model in discrete-
time for the P-R strategy of an insurance market is constructed. The utility and
the reserve functions are discussed and the main model’s assumptions as well as their
necessary economic interpretation are provided. In Section 4.4, the calculation of the
optimal premium is derived which is presented using two Theorems. Additionally,
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in this section, some special cases of the function fk(Rk,p˜k, θk) are presented. The
discussion of the main results is given in Section 4.5. Finally, Section 4.6 presents a
numerical application to illustrate further the theoretical findings of the chapter.
In chapter 5 some recommendations concerning further research are presented. An-
alytically, section 5.1 presents a discussion concerning models’ assumptions and the
volume of business function and section 5.2 refers to the utility function. Finally,
section 5.3 refers to modeling company’s wealth function either introducing a wealth
function which included risk investment or construct a wealth function which connects
directly company’s wealth and claims.
In chapter 6 the main conclusions of each chapter are presented and complete the
thesis.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Premium Strategy in a
Competitive Market
2.1 Motivation
Nowadays, the number of products from different insurance companies has been sig-
nificantly increased because of several micro and macro economical challenges, of the
strong market competition and of the boosting securitization needs of the new era af-
ter the last (global) financial crisis. However, there is still little literature available
in actuarial science on modelling how insurance premiums should be determined in
competitive market environments, and how the competition actually affects the deter-
mination of the companys premiums; see for further discussion Daykin et al. [15] and
Emms et al. [18].
It is well-known in the insurance industry that the fair pricing process for non-life
products is a crucial issue for every General Insurance company, especially within the
unfolding of the timebound detariffing road map by Insurance Regulatory and Devel-
opment Authority (IRDA) which is once again under a great concern and publicity;
see the recent article in Insurance Chronicle, Ramana [63]. Consequently, the fail-
ure of a uniform and global price in any Insurance Market, which can be based only
on the premium rates, the policy terms and the conditions applicable to a particular
portfolio of risks, force the insurance companies to provide more competitive prices.
Especially, nowadays because of the global financial crisis, the premium strategy must
be determined more accurately and competitively in order to ensure the viability of
each company and to increase the volume of business in a long-term.
Inevitably, several questions can arise. For instance, in this chapter, we would like
to mention just a few of them: ”What is the optimal premium strategy for an individual
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insurance company and for a specific portfolio of homogeneous or/and heterogeneous
risks?”; ”how is this related to the competitive market?”; ”how does the volume of
business affect the premium strategy?” are only some of the questions that can be
stated, and with non-trivial or straightforward answers.
2.2 New approach
In chapter 2, we introduce a stochastic demand function for the volume of business
of an insurance company into a discrete-time extending further Taylor’s ideas [71, 72].
Moreover, using a linear discounted function for the wealth process of the company, as
Emms et al. [18] have considered, we provide an analytical (endogenous) formula for
the optimal premium strategy of the insurance company when it is expected to lose
part of the market. Mathematically speaking, we create a maximization problem for the
wealth process of a company, which has been solved using stochastic dynamic program-
ming. Thus, the optimal controller (i.e. the premium) is defined endogenously by the
market as the company struggles to increase its volume of business into a competitive
environment with the same characteristics as Taylor [71, 72], Emms and Haberman[17]
and Emms et al.[18] have used. Therefore, we consider three different strategies for
the average premium of the market, and the optimal premium policy is derived and
fully investigated. The results of this chapter are further evaluated by using data from
the Greek Automobile Insurance Industry. In section 2.3 a discrete-time model for
the insurance market is formulated. We discuss appropriate values for the model pa-
rameters and adopt suitable parameterizations. In section 2.4 the calculation of the
optimal prmium is presented. The next section 2.5 considers a numerical calculation
and each strategy in turn: we find analytical forms for the optimal strategies. In Pre-
mium Strategy I, the average premium of the market is calculated considering all the
competitors of the market, and their proportions regarding the volume of business. In
Premium Strategy II, the average premium of market is calculated considering the top
5 competitors of the market and in Premium Strategy III considering company’s direct
competitors.
2.3 Model Formulation
In this paper, as in Taylor [71], and Emms et al. [18], we make the following assump-
tions.
• Assumption 1:There is positive price-elasticity of demand, i.e. if the market
as a whole begins underwriting at a loss, any attempt by a particular insurer to
maintain profitability will result in a reduction of his volume of business.
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• Assumption 2: There is a finite time horizon.
• Assumption 3: Demand in year k+ 1 is assumed to be proportional to demand
in the preceding year k.
• Assumption 4: θk affects the volume of business in a linear way (i.e. additive
noise).
Additionally, extending Taylor’s assumptions [71, 72], we assume that the demand
function is stochastic (because of θk and p¯k).
Here, we denote the wealth process wk as the insurer’s capital at time [k, k + 1),
following Emms et al. [18] ideas, so we obtain
wk+1 = −αkwk + (pk − pik)Vk, (2.1)
where αk denotes the excess return on capital (i.e. return on capital required by the
shareholders of the insurer whose strategy is under consideration). Thus, −αkwk is the
cost of holding wk in the time interval [k, k + 1).
Following Taylor [71, 72], the volume of business of an insurance company for a
given sequence of average market prices over the kth year is given by a relation of the
following type
Vk = fk (Vk−1, pk, p¯k, θk) , (2.2)
where pk is the controller and θk denotes the set of all other random variables (dis-
turbances) which are considered to be relevant to the demand function. Under this
assumption Vk is stochastic and depends on k.
Our aim is to determine the strategy which maximizes the expected total utility of
the wealth at time k over a finite time horizon T . As it has been also considered by
Emms et al. [18] , we use a linear discounted function (of wealth).
Analytically, we want to maximize
max
pk
E
[
T∑
k=0
U(wk, k)
]
, (2.3)
where U(wk, k) = υ
kwk is the present value of the wealth wk. Consequently, substitut-
ing (2.2) into (2.1), the wealth process wk is given by (2.4)
wk+1 = −akwk + (pk − pik)fk(Vk−1, pk, p¯k, θk), (2.4)
and w0, V0, V−1 (the volume of business now and for the previous year) a0, p0, pi0, p¯0
and θ0 are the initial conditions.
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Extending Taylor’s ideas [71, 72], who assumed that the volume of business in year
k + 1 is proportional to the demand of the preceding year, in this chapter we propose
that the volume of business is proportional to the average premium charged by the
market (see Assumption 3), but reverse proportional to the premium rate charged by
the insurer in year k. Empirically speaking, this new approach might be considered a
little more realistic, since it is true that whenever the average premium stays unchanged
and the premium charged by the insurer increases, unavoidably the company’s volume
of business might decrease. On the other hand, whenever the premium calculated by the
insurer stays unchanged and the average premium decreases, the volume of business
might decrease as well. These thoughts lead to the assumption that the volume of
business should be proportional to the rate p¯kpk .
Additionally, it is more realistic to assume that there might be an unexpected set
of parameters, which can modify (i.e. decrease or increase) the volume of business.
Consequently, we can assume that this set of parameters can be modelled using the
stochastic variable θk, which can take either positive or negative values. In this chapter,
since we are more interested in investigating the premium strategy of an insurance
company when it is expected to lose part of the market, we assume that the expected
values of θk is positive (i.e. E (θk) > µ, where µ > 0 is a deductible parameter which
can be predefined by the managerial team)and then the volume of business is strictly
decreasing, i.e. loosing part of the competitive market. Obviously, within the next
lines, the case E (θk) < µ is also discussed, however this case is not very interested
since it implies that the insurance company is increasing gradually its volume, and any
change in its premium policy might affect it negatively.
Consequently, we can assume that the volume of business is given by
Vk = Vk−1
p¯k
pk
− θk. (2.5)
2.4 Calculation of the Optimal Premium
After the basic notations, and the mathematical formulation of the problem, we need
to calculate the optimal premium, which maximize the expected total utility of the
wealth (2.3).
Following the general ideas about stochastic dynamic programming and control
theory into a discrete-time framework, see for instance the classical book by Kushner
[49] and Bertzekas [4], we determine the strategy which maximises the expected total
utility of wealth (2.3) over a finite time horizon, and over a choice of strategies. This
is similar to the objective function used by Taylor [71, 72], and Emms et al. [18].
The next Theorem provides us with the optimal premium strategy for the finite
time horizon maximization problem (2.3)-(2.5), see also Jacobson [40] and Kushner
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[49]
Theorem 1. For the wealth process {wk}k∈0,1,.....,T−1 given by
wk+1 = −akwk + (pk − pik)
(
Vk−1
p¯k
pk
− θk
)
, (2.6)
where E (θk) > µ > 0, and for the maximization problem defined by
max
pk
E/wk
[
T−1∑
i=k
υiwi
]
, (2.7)
with initial conditions w0, V0, a0, p0, pi0, p¯0 and θ0, the optimal strategy process p
∗
k
is given by
p∗k =
(
1
E (θk)
pikVk−1E(p¯k)
)1/2
fork ∈ N, (2.8)
where p¯k, pik is the ”average” and the break-even premium respectively, in year k; Vk−1
is the volume of exposure underwritten by the insurer in year k − 1, and E (θk) is the
expectation of the (stochastic) disturbance θk in year k and the maximum value of (2.7)
is given by
w0d0 + e0, (2.9)
dk = akdk+1 − υk , and dT = 0, (2.10)
ek =− dk+1
((
1
E (θk)
pikVk−1E (p¯k)
)1/2
E (θk)− Vk−1E (p¯k)
)
+
+ dk+1pik
(
E (θk)− Vk−1E (p¯k)
(
1
E (θk)
pikVk−1E (p¯k)
)−1/2)
+ ek+1,, and eT = 0.
(2.11)
Proof. Define
Jk (wk)
∆
= max
pk,pk+1,......,pT−1
E/wk
[
T−1∑
i=k
υiwi
]
. (2.12)
Then, as it is known [40] the optimal performance criterion satisfied the Bellman equa-
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tion
Jk (wk) =, max
pk
E/wk
{
υkwk + Jk+1 (wk + 1)
}
= max
pk
{
υkwk + E/wkJk+1 (wk + 1)
}
, (2.13)
where E/wk (p¯k) = E (p¯k), E/wk (θk) = E (θk) > µ > 0 and JT (wT ) = wTdT + eT = 0;
see (2.10) and ((2.11). We now show by induction that
JT (wk) = wkdk + ek, (2.14)
solves (2.13) by noting that (2.14) is true for k = T by assuming that (2.14) is true for
k+1 and by proving is true for k. Substituting the assumed expression for Jk+1 (wk + 1)
into the right hand side (2.13) we obtain
Jk (wk) = max
pk
{
υkwk + E/wkJk+1 (wk + 1)
}
= max
pk
{
υkwk + E/wk (wk+1) dk+1 + ek+1
}
,
and from (2.6) we have
max
pk
{
υkwk + E/wk [−akwk + (pk − pik)Vk] dk+1 + ek+1
}
= max
pk
{
υkwk − akwkdk+1 + dk+1 (pk − pik)
(
Vk−1
E(p¯k)
pk
− E (θk)
)
+ ek+1
}
= max
pk
{
υkwk − akwkdk+1 − dk+1 (pkE (θk)− Vk−1E (p¯k))
+dk+1pik
(
E (θk)− Vk−1 E(p¯k)pk
)
+ ek+1
= max
pk
{−wk (akdk+1 − υk)− dk+1 (pkE (θk)− Vk−1E (p¯k))
+dk+1pik
(
E (θk)− Vk−1 E(p¯k)pk
)
+ ek+1.
(2.15)
The controller that maximizes the above expression (2.15), is given by (2.8), since
A = wk
(
υk − akdk+1
)
+(Vk−1E (p¯k)− pkE (θk)) dk+1−dk+1pik
(
Vk−1
E (p¯k)
pk
− E (θk)
)
+ek+1.
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The first derivative of A with respect to pk is given
∂A
∂pk
= dk+1pikVk−1E (p¯k)p2k − dk+1E (θk) = dk+1
(
pikVk−1
E (p¯k)
p2k
− E (θk)
)
.
If we equalize the first derivative with zero, i.e. ∂A∂pk = 0, we obtain
dk+1
(
pikVk−1
E (p¯k)
p2k
− E (θk)
)
= 0
dk+1 6=0,E(θk)>µ>0⇔ pikVk−1E (p¯k)
p2k
− E (θk) = 0.
The above expression gives the optimal strategy (2.8) as
∂A
∂2pk
= −2pikVk−1E (p¯k) dk+1 1
p3k
< 0,
where pik, Vk−1, E (p¯k), 1p3k
and dk+1 > 0. Now, let’s substitute the above into (2.15),
we obtain
− wk
(
akdk+1 − υk
)
− dk+1
((
1
E (θk)
pikVk−1E (p¯k)
)1/2
E (θk)− Vk−1E (p¯k)
)
+ dk+1pik
(
E (θk)− Vk−1
(
1
E (θk)
pikVk−1E (p¯k)
)−1/2)
+ ek+1.
Substituting (2.10) and (2.11) in the above expression yields the fact that (2.14) is true.
Thus, the proof of the Theorem 1 by induction is complete.
Remark 1. As it is quite likely in practice, the optimal premium strategy given by
(2.6) expression depends endogenously on the volume of business of the previous year,
the break-even premium rate, the expected value of the average premium rate of the
market and the (stochastic) variable θk.
Remark 2. In order to calculate the optimal premium strategy, initially we have to
calculate the expectation of θk which models the set of all other parameters considered
to be relevant to the demand function of each company, and the insurance market (i.e.
financial environment, managerial policy etc); see also Assumption 4. In particular,
as it has been clearly stated in the introduction; see also Remark 3, and Proposition
1, we are interested to modify the premium strategy when our volume of business is
strictly decreasing because of the positive E (θk) > µ. Note that as it came clear from
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the relation (2.5) θk is equal to Vk−1 p¯kpk − Vk for each previous year.
Remark 3. In a competitive market environment, we have considered that the volume
of business in each company is strictly decreasing when the expectation of the stochastic
variable (disturbance) θk in year k = 0, 1, ...., T − 1 takes positive values. Thus, the
company should change the premium policy in order to enlarge its volume. On contrary,
for negative or below the deductible point µ > 0 values for the expectation of θk, i.e.
E (θk) < µ, the previous premium strategy might stay unchanged (see next corollary),
since the company does not lose (significant) part of the market (i.e. by decreasing its
volume).
The following proposition considers the case where the volume of business changes
either above or below µ > 0 (i.e., for decreasing or increasing the volume of business
above or below the required level, respectively).
Remark 4. Moreover, we can show that the optimal expected wealth of the company
at the year k + 1 is given by (2.16).
E
(
w∗k+1
)
= Vk−1E (p¯k)+pikE (θk)−
{
akwk + 2(E (θk)pikVk−1E (p¯k))1/2
}
for E (θk) > µ.
(2.16)
As Taylor [71, 72], and Emms et al.[18] propose, and in order to take benefit of
the analytical formula derived by Theorem 1 for the determination of the premium
strategies into a competitive environment, in the next section we use data from the
Greek automobile insurance industry, see also the tables of the Hellenic Association
of Insurance Companies (2010). Moreover, we assume that the premium strategies
concern the price of a contract which refers to a six-month insurance for a car that is
1400cc, 10 years old and its value estimated at 5.000 euros.
2.5 Numerical Application
2.5.1 Data
In the next section we use data from the Greek automobile insurance industry, see also
the tables of the Hellenic Association of Insurance Companies (2010). Moreover, we
assume that the premium strategies concern the price of a contract which refers to a
six-month insurance for a car that is 1400cc, 10 years old and its value estimated at
5.000 euros. The number of the available data is limited but for the purpose of our
application, this drawback is not crucial.
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2.5.2 Premium strategy I: Considering the Entire Market
In the first premium strategy, the expected average premium is calculated consider-
ing all the competitors of the market, and their proportions regarding the volume of
business. In mathematical terms the expected average premium of the market can be
estimated by
E (p¯) =
1
m
K∑
i=1
bi,npi,n, (2.17)
where bi,n = Vi,n
(
K∑
i=1
Vi,n
)−1
and
K∑
i=1
bi,n = 1 for every year n, pi,n is the premium of
the company ith for the year n; K is the number of the competitors (including also
our company’s premium) in the insurance market and m is the number of years for
the available data (i.e. we assume that we have the uniform distribution for the weight
of every year). Moreover, for the calculation of the expected values of the premium
of each company and the average market premium respectively, we use the available
Greek data, see next paragraphs.
Proposition 1. Considering (2.8) and (2.17), the optimal controller (i.e. premium)
for the premium strategy I is equal to
p∗k =
√√√√ 1
mE (θk)
pikVk−1
K∑
i=1
bi,npi,n, (2.18)
for E (θk) > µ > 0, k = 0, 1, ...., T − 1.
Proof. The proof derives straightforwardly, and it is omitted.
2.5.3 Premium strategy II: Following the Leaders of the Market
E (p¯) =
1
m
Ktop∑
i=1
btopi,np
top
i,n , (2.19)
where btopi,n = Vi,n
(
Ktop∑
i=1
Vi,n
)−1
and
Ktop∑
i=1
btopi,n = 1 for every year n, p
top
i,n is the premium of
the ith top company for the year n; Ktop is the number of the top competitors (including
also our company’s premium) in the insurance market and m is the number of years for
the available data (i.e. we assume that we have the uniform distribution for the weight
of every year). Next, similar to the Proposition 2, we obtain the following Proposition.
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Proposition 2. Considering (2.8) and (2.19), the optimal controller (i.e. premium)
for the premium strategy II is equal to
p∗k =
√√√√ 1
mE (θk)
pikVk−1
Ktop∑
i=1
btopi,np
top
i,n , (2.20)
for E (θk) > µ > 0, , k = 0, 1, ....., T − 1.
Proof. The proof derives straightforwardly, and it is omitted.
2.5.4 Premium strategy III: Following the Direct Competitors
E (p¯) =
1
m
Kdir∑
i=1
bdiri,np
dir
i,n ∗ di,n, (2.21)
where bdiri,n = Vi,n
(
Kdir∑
i=1
Vi,n
)−1
and
Kdir∑
i=1
bdiri,n = 1 for every year n, p
dir
i,n is the premium
of the ith direct competitor (company) for the year n; Kdir is the number of direct
competitors (without including our company’s premium) in the insurance market, di,n
is the direct competitive factor which shows in what extend the direct competitor is
similar to our company and m is the number of years for the available data (i.e. we
assume that we have the uniform distribution for the weight of every year).
The direct competitor factor is indicative to how the company that though as direct
competitor is similar to our company’s and affect our volume of business. This factor
depends mainly on three other parameters:
• company’s operational efficiency,
• product leadership,
• customer intimacy.
Additionally, the factors that a company will examine to identify their direct competi-
tors in the market are the following:
• competitor’s main focus and propositions,
• competitor’s geographic target,
• competitor’s target sector,
• type of organization the competitor choose,
• competitor’s paying targets,
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• service that competitor’s provides,
• competitor’s efficiency,
• competitor’s target group.
Next, we obtain the following Proposition.
Proposition 3. Considering (2.8) and (2.21), the optimal controller (i.e. premium)
for the premium strategy III is equal to
p∗k =
√√√√ 1
mE (θk)
pikVk−1
Kdir∑
i=1
bdiri,np
dir
i,n ∗ di,n , (2.22)
for E (θk) > µ > 0, , k = 0, 1, ....., T − 1.
Proof. The proof derives straightforwardly, and it is omitted.
2.5.5 Numerical Algorithm
Summarizing the discussion in the previous Section, in this sub-section, the algorithmic
steps for the calculation of the optimal premium are described.
Step 1: Collect the necessary (historical) data from the insurance market.
The first step requires the collection of data concerning the number of companies which
are in the market, their volume of business and the premium charged from each com-
pany for the previous years, respectively. Obviously if it is possible to collect data for
a significant number of years the results will be more reliable.
Step 2: Estimate market’s average premium.
Choose one of the three recommended premium strategies and estimate market’s aver-
age premium for each one of the previous years and the expectation of market’s average
premium for the next year, p¯k. As it has been assumed in the previous sub-section, the
average premium can be calculated either considering the entire market or considering
the leaders of the market or the direct competitors, see eq. (2.17), (2.19) and (2.21).
Then, step 3 follows.
Step 3: Estimate parameter expectation of θk.
Moreover, the impact of the other stochastic parameters, θk, needs to be estimated.
Based on historical data and market’s average premium one can estimate parameter θk
which is equal to θk = Vk−1 p¯kpk − Vk for each previous year, as it came clear from the
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relation 2.5. After the calculation of the stochastic parameter θk for each previous year
the calculation of the expected value of θk for the next year must be taken place and
this parameter can be given by
E (θk) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
θˆi. (2.23)
If E (θk) < µ, the previous premium strategy might stay unchanged (see corollary),
since the company does not lose (significant) part of the market. If E (θk) > µ > 0,
step 4 follows.
Step 4: Calculate the optimal premium.
Using the estimated parameters E (θk), p¯k and the information collected of step 1 the
next step is to calculate the optimal premium according to (2.8) for different values of
break-even premium (pik). Then, step 5 follows.
Step 5: Design the optimal premium strategy for the insurance company.
Now, for different values of the break-even premium pi the actuary can generate different
values for the optimal premium, see previous step. Then after taking into considera-
tion the competition in the current (or targeting) insurance market and expectation of
the different macroeconomic parameters (i.e. based on the random variable, θk), the
optimal premium is calculated and agreed by the senior management of the companies.
2.5.6 Numerical Calculation and Discussion
As we have mentioned earlier premium strategy I considers the premium and the volume
of business of the entire market. The expected average premium of the market is
estimated using the (2.17) expression, i.e. as an expected weighted average of each
competitor that gets involved in the market. Moreover, it is clear that the premium of
the company with the largest volume of business affects most of the market (see also
Premium Strategy II). In Table 2.1, the premium prices and the number of contracts
for the 12 major non-life Greek insurance companies for a standard six-month cover
of a 10-year old, 1400cc car (with 5.000 Euros covered amount) are presented for the
years 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009.
As we can observe in Table 2.1, and according to the oligopoly theory which be-
gan in 1838 with Cournot’s oligopoly model, see for more details Friedman [27] and
the references therein, the Greek non-life insurance industry has an oligopoly market
characteristic, since there are only a few main competitors, the insurance products are
almost identical (with non-significant differences) and the ownership of the key inputs
and barriers imposed by the government. Thus, in the case of oligopolistic market, the
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revenues of the firms depend on the actions of other competitors as we have considered
in our premium strategies; see also Emms et al. [18] and Taylor [71, 72].
Insurance 2006 2007 2008 2009
Companies premium contracts premium contracts premium contracts premium contracts
A 269.09 298,269 280.30 280,991 301.00 261,196 307.35 240,698
B 282.07 303,673 293.82 308,766 306.06 278,362 315.53 250,614
C 377.06 282,224 392.77 252,630 413.44 258,683 430.67 266,414
D 371.52 304,609 404.96 255,250 437.35 263,510 451.35 278,321
E 281.56 295,769 292.96 258,181 304.71 274,382 323.68 243,294
F 377.83 796,139 397.71 687,485 432.30 726,317 469.89 779,376
G 257.88 298,304 268.62 325,836 291.98 273,470 307.35 271,487
H 366.99 200,135 386.30 182,989 402.40 258,534 423.58 267,341
I 347.58 211,314 373.74 278,174 397.59 283,295 418.52 284,889
J 351.18 299,690 377.02 318,876 392.73 316,556 426.88 338,434
K 364.11 299,995 378.67 340,898 401.39 344,771 429.09 396,112
L 291.22 319,453 302.87 287,524 314.98 246,976 331.77 241,609
Table 2.1: Premium prices in Euros and number of contracts for the 12 major non-life
Greek insurance companies, see Hellenic Association of Insurance Companies (2010).
Volume of Business b (%) 2006 2007 2008 2009
A 7.63% 7.44% 6.90% 6.24%
B 7.77% 8.17% 7.35% 6.49%
C 7.22% 6.69% 6.83% 6.90%
D 7.79% 6.76% 6.96% 7.21%
E 7.57% 6.83% 7.25% 6.31%
F 20.36% 18.20% 19.18% 20.20%
G 7.63% 8.63% 7.22% 7.04%
H 5.12% 4.84% 6.83% 6.93%
I 5.41% 7.36% 7.48% 7.38%
J 7.67% 8.44% 8.36% 8.77%
K 7.67% 9.02% 9.11% 10.27%
L 8.17% 7.61% 6.52% 6.26%
Table 2.2: The volume of business, b, in % for the 12 major non-life Greek insurance
companies.
According to the premium strategy I, the average premium of the market is equal
to the weighted average of the premiums of all the companies involved in the market
for every year. Moreover, the volume of business of each company for the years 2006-
2009 is presented in Table 2.2. Finally, Table 2.3 summarizes the results of the (2.17)
expression.
As it has already been mentioned above in order to calculate the optimal premium
for each company first, we have to estimate the expectation of θk which models the set of
all other parameters considered to be relevant to the demand function of each company,
and the insurance market (i.e. financial environment, managerial policy etc). As it is
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Average Premium (P.S.I) Amount in Euros
E (p¯k) 364.69
Table 2.3: The expected average premium in Euros of the market for the year 2010 is
given by E (p¯) = 1m
K∑
i=1
bi,npi,n.
clear from the relation (2.5) θˆk (estimation of θk) can be calculated by θˆk = Vk−1 p¯kpk−Vk.
Thus, considering the above expression, and for the available Greek data we are
able to calculate θˆk for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009 as it is shown at Table 2.4. So,
the expected value of θk for the year 2010 can be given by E (θk) = 1m
m∑
i=1
θˆi.
Then, in Table 2.4, we present the expected values of θk (using the estimations of
θk). As has been already mentioned before, θk denotes the number of contracts that
the company loses or gains because of the parameters that affect the volume of business
and they have not been included in the model. In our application, the large fluctuations
in the expected values of θk occur due to
a) the limited number of the available data, and
b) the impact on each company’s volume of business into the market.
(Note that since we have available data for only 4 years, it is difficult to provide a good
estimation for the expected values of θk. However, for the purpose of our application,
this drawback is not crucial.)
Companies 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 E (θk)
A 90,752 -0.19% 89,088 -0.54% 100,437 -0.66% 93,426
B 52,299 0.41% 100,178 -0.82% 103,515 -0.86% 85,331
C -1,605 -0.53% -29,404 0.14% -25,304 0.07% -18,771
D 7,533 -1.03% -44,518 0.20% -43,965 0.25% -26,984
E 94,520 -0.73% 43,548 0.41% 96,983 -0.94% 78,350
F 11,841 -2.16% -129,593 0.99% -158,903 1.01% -92,218
G 62,115 1.00% 145,262 -1.40% 85,678 -0.19% 97,685
H -1,998 -0.28% -87,902 1.98% -22,336 0.10% -37,412
I -80,649 1.96% -20,770 0.12% -13,172 -0.10% -38,197
J -41,180 0.78% -11,891 -0.08% -40,763 0.41% -31,278
K -64,134 1.35% -26,097 0.08% -73,578 1.16% -54,603
L 80,957 -0.56% 95,540 -1.09% 57,216 -0.26% 77,904
Table 2.4: The values of θˆk, the change in percentage for the volume of business for the
years 2007-2009, and the expected values of θk for the year 2010.
The values of the stochastic variable θk can be either above or below µ > 0. As we
have extensively discussed in section 2, we will determine the optimal premium strategy
for the year 2010 only for those companies which have positive E (θk) > 0.
These companies are A, B, E, G and L, see Figure 2.1.
In Table 2.5, we present the premium for each company for the different values of
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Figure 2.1: The real and the expected volume of business for the 5 Greek insurance
companies that have positive E (θk) > µ.
the break-even premium rate.
piκ 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Companies E (θk)
A 93,426 240.32 294.33 339.87 379.98 416.25
B 85,331 259.98 318.41 367.67 411.07 450.30
E 78,350 270.76 331.61 382.91 428.10 468.96
G 97,685 249.60 305.70 352.99 394.66 432.33
L 77,744 273.95 335.51 387.42 433.15 474.49
Table 2.5: The optimal premium strategy in Euros for the 5 Greek insurance compa-
nies that have positive E (θk) for the different values of the break-even premium rate
(Premium Strategy I).
As it is expected, for greater values of the pik, greater the optimal premium values
become. Consequently, since the optimal premium depends on the break-even premium
rate, the company should choose its competitive strategy considering the market’s
construction and its marginal costs; see also Emms et al. [18]. Thus, each company
should predetermine its break-even premium rate, in order to calculate the optimal
premium strategy which will enlarge its volume of business. The results of Table 2.5
are shown also at Figure 2.1.
The results of Table 2.5 (see also Figure 2.2) are seemingly interesting. For the five
insurance companies (A, B, E, G, and L) which expected to experience losses on their
volume of business, for a break-even premium rate of 20-30 % calculated by the formula
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(2.18), premiums are below the market average premium of 364.69e. Additionally, it
is true that the insurance companies E and L which face similar losses (see Tables 2.1,
2.2, and 2.4) should provide similar premiums, which appear to be the most expensive
premiums compared with the premiums of the other 3 companies.
Figure 2.2: The optimal premium strategy in Euros for the 5 Greek insurance compa-
nies that have positive E (θk) for the different values of the break-even premium rate
(Premium Strategy I).
At this point, it should be mentioned that in this paper, we are not able to analyze
further the results of Table 2.1, and consequently of Table 2.5 (and Figure 2.2), since
the analysis of the Greek insurance market, and the micro/macro conditions that get
involved for the determination of the premium strategy is far beyond the scopes of the
present version of the present chapter. Additionally, the macro-micro economic analysis
of the parameters that affect θk are partially investigated at chapter 4.
Following the second premium strategy, the average premium is calculated consid-
ering the premiums of the top Ktop competitors of the market (including the leading
company of the market). In mathematical terms the expected average premium of the
market is estimated by (2.19).
For the purpose of this application, we consider the premium and the volume of
business of the top 5 Greek insurance companies. Consequently, the expected average
premium of the market is calculated using the (2.19) expression.
In Table 2.6, the premiums and the number of contracts for the 5 leading non-life
Greek insurance companies are presenting for the years 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009.
Thus, for the years 2006, we calculate the average premium considering the premium
and the volume of business for the companies B, D, F, K, and L; for the year 2007 : B,
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F, G, J and K; for the year 2008 : B, F, I, J and K and for the year 2009: D, F, I, J
and K. In Table 7, the volume of business is presented.
2006 2007 2008 2009
IC premium contracts IC premium contracts IC premium contracts IC premium contracts
B 282.07 303,673 B 293.82 308,766 B 306.06 278,362 D 451.35 278,321
D 371.52 304,609 F 397.71 687,485 F 432.30 726,317 F 469.89 779,376
F 377.83 304,609 G 268.62 325,836 I 397.59 283,295 I 418.52 284,889
K 364.11 796,139 J 377.02 318,876 J 392.73 316,556 J 426.88 338,434
L 291.22 319,453 K 378.67 340,898 K 401.39 344,771 K 429.09 396,112
Table 2.6: Premiums prices in Euros and number of contracts for the top 5 non-life
Greek insurance companies (IC); see Friedman [27](Premium Strategy II).
According to the premium strategy II, the average premium of the market is equal
to the weighted average of the premiums of the top 5 companies in the market for every
year. Finally, Table 2.8 summarizes the results of the (2.19) expression.
2006 2007 2008 2009
15.00% (B) 15.58% (B) 14.28% (B) 13.40% (D)
15.05% (D) 34.69% (F) 37.26% (F) 37.52% (F)
39.34% (F) 16.44% (G) 14.53% (I) 13.72% (I)
14.82% (K) 16.09% (J) 16.24% (J) 16.29% (J)
15.78% (L) 17.20% (K) 17.69% (K) 19.07% (K)
Table 2.7: The weights in % for the calculation of the average premium for the top 5
non-life Greek insurance companies.
Average Premium (P.S.I) Amount in Euros
E (p¯k) 385.85
Table 2.8: The expected average premium in Euros of the market for the year 2010 is
given by E (p¯) = 1m
Ktop∑
i=1
btopi,np
top
i,n .
Now, we calculate again the estimation of θk, since the average premium of the
market for the years 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 has changed. Additionally, the average
premium in the Premium Strategy I is higher than in the Premium Strategy II. So, in
Table 2.9, we present the expected values of θk.
Next, we will determine the optimal premium strategy for the year 2010 only for
those companies which have positive E(θk) with µ > 10, 000 (the managerial team is
not interested in modifying the premium when it expects to lose only a few thousand
contracts), i.e. A, B, E, G and L.
The results of Table 2.10 (see also Figure 2.3) are also similar with those of the
Premium Strategy I, since the five insurance companies have premiums significantly
below the market average premium of 385.85efor a break-even premium rate of 20-
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Companies 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 E (θk)
A 95,379 -0.19% 109,731 -0.54% 137,962 -0.66% 114,357
B 56,793 0.41% 122,456 -0.82% 142,470 -0.86% 107,250
C 1,520 -0.53% -15,893 0.14% 1,219 0.07% -4,385
D 10,804 -1.03% -31,613 0.20% -18,186 0.25% -12,998
E 98,910 -0.73% 62,284 0.41% 134,414 -0.94% 98,536
F 20,546 -2.16% -94,427 0.99% -90,651 1.01% -54,844
G 66,944 1.00% 169,939 -1.40% 124,967 -0.19% 120,617
H 255 -0.28% -77,846 1.98% 4,615 0.10% -24,326
I -78,190 1.96% -5,299 0.12% 16,716 -0.10% -22,258
J -37,724 0.78% -6,063 -0.08% -8,018 0.41% -13,226
K -60,689 1.35% -7,317 0.08% -38,099 1.16% -35,368
L 85,544 -0.56% 115,725 -1.09% 90,087 -0.26% 97,118
Table 2.9: The values of θˆk, the change in percentage for the volume of business for the
years 2007-2009, and the expected values of θk for the year 2010.
40%.
Now, if we would like to compare the findings of the two Premium Strategies, we can
easily see that the Premium Strategy II is cheaper (i.e. it provides lower premiums) than
the Premium Strategy I for all the A, B, E, G and L insurance companies. This result
was expected, as in the Greek insurance market, the leader (dominator) companies
have expensive premiums, above the average premium of the market.
piκ 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Companies E (θk)
A 114,357 223.43 273.65 315.98 353.28 387.00
B 107,250 238.53 292.14 337.34 377.16 413.15
E 98,536 248.34 304.16 351.21 392.67 430.14
G 120,617 231.05 282.98 326.76 365.33 400.20
L 97,118 252.38 309.10 356.91 399.04 437.13
Table 2.10: The optimal premium strategy in Euros for the 5 Greek insurance com-
panies that have positive E (θk) for the different values of the break-even premium
rate(Premium Strategy II).
The last premium strategy calculates the average premium taking into account
company’s direct competitors in the market. The direct competitors are companies
with similar operational efficiency, product leadership and customer intimacy. It is
rational for an ”average” (not leading) company not to target increasing it’s volume of
business by ”stealing” customers from the leading company or companies but instead
trying to augment its volume by targeting new customers from companies which have
the same economic conditions and key marketing factors.
If for example company E choose to follow the third premium strategy then market’s
average premium will be calculated with companies which have the most close volume of
business value and with premium lower than company’s E. If we calculate the absolute
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Figure 2.3: Optimal premium for the year 2010 (Premium Strategy II).
value of the difference between company’s E volume of business and all the other
companies in the market and the difference between company’s E premium and all
the other premiums for the computation of market’s average premium we will use the
two (because of the small number of companies in the market) companies with the
minimum absolute value and positive premium difference.
Thus, for the years 2006, 2007 and 2008 we calculate the average premium consider-
ing the premium and the volume of business for the companies A and G and for the year
2009 the companies A and B. In Table 2.11, the volume of business is presented.Another
crucial factor that must be taken into account is how similar and competitive are these
companies. These can be taken into account by the competitive factor which affects
each company’s premium’s affection to the average premium. The competitive factor
between company’s E and its direct competitors are shown in Table 2.12.
2006 2007 2008 2009
50.00% (A) 46.30% (A) 48.85% (A) 48.99% (A)
50.05% (G) 53.70% (G) 51.15% (G) 51.01% (B)
Table 2.11: The weights in % for the calculation of the average premium for Company’s
E direct competitors.
Company E 2006 2007 2008 2009
A 1.22 A 1.29 A 1.28 A 1.30
G 1.24 G 1.41 G 1.20 B 1.24
Table 2.12: Competitive factor for Company’s E direct competitors.
39
According to the premium strategy III, the average premium of the market is equal
to the weighted average of the premiums of the direct competitors times the competitive
factor between Company E and each direct competitors. Finally, Table 2.12 summarizes
the results of the (2.21) expression.
Average Premium (P.S.I) Amount in Euros
E (p¯k) 364.40
Now, we calculate again the estimation of θk, since the average premium of the
market for the years 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 has changed. Additionally, the average
premium in the Premium Strategy III is different than in the Premium Strategy I and
II. So, in Table 2.14, we present the expected values of θk.
Companies 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 E (θk)
A 113,586 -0.19% 81,809 -0.54% 95,258 -0.66% 96,884
B 74,477 0.41% 92,312 -0.82% 98,139 -0.86% 88,309
C 13,814 -0.53% -34,169 0.14% -28,964 0.07% -16,440
D 23,673 -1.03% -49,069 0.20% -47,523 0.25% -24,306
E 116,184 -0.73% 36,941 0.41% 91,817 -0.94% 81,648
F 54,796 -2.16% -141,993 0.99% -168,323 1.01% -85,173
G 85,945 1.00% 136,561 -1.40% 80,256 -0.19% 100,921
H 9,119 -0.28% -91,448 1.98% -26,055 0.10% -36,128
I -68,516 1.96% -26,225 0.12% -17,298 -0.10% -37,346
J -24,123 0.78% -18,222 -0.08% -45,282 0.41% -29,209
K -47,134 1.35% -32,719 0.08% -78,475 1.16% -52,776
L 103,590 -0.56% 88,422 -1.09% 52,679 -0.26% 81,564
Table 2.14: The values of θˆk, the change in percentage for the volume of business for
the years 2007-2009, and the expected values of θk for the year 2010.
Next, we will determine the optimal premium strategy for the year 2010 only for
company E since we are interesting only on this comapny. Company E also has positive
E(θk) with µ > 10, 000 (the managerial team is not interested in modifying the premium
when it expects to lose only a few thousand contracts).
The results of Table 2.15 are also similar with those of the Premium Strategy I and
II for a break-even premium rate of 20-30%.
piκ 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Companies E (θk)
E 81,648 265.13 324.71 374.95 419.20 459.21
Table 2.15: The optimal premium strategy in Euros for the Company E that has positive
E (θk) for the different values of the break-even premium rate(Premium Strategy III).
Now, if we would like to compare the findings of the three Premium Strategies,
we can easily see that the Premium Strategy II is cheaper than three and one (i.e. it
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provides lower premiums) for company E. This result was expected, as in the Greek
insurance market, the leader (dominator) companies have expensive premiums, above
the average premium of the market. Moreover the premium strategy III provides lower
premium than premium strategy I and higher than premium strategy II. This quite
rational since the strategy for competiting the leaders of the market is to low premium
in order to augement its volume of business. On the contrary when the company focus
on its direct competitors it can maximize its wealth by charging higher premiums than
the one that come up from premium strategies II. See also table 2.15 and figure 2.4.
Company E piκ 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Premium Strategy E (θk)
I 78,350 270.76 331.61 382.91 428.10 468.96
II 98,536 248.34 304.16 351.21 392.67 430.14
III 81,648 265.13 324.71 374.95 419.20 459.21
Table 2.16: The optimal premium strategy in Euros for the Company E that has
positive E (θk) for the different values of the break-even premium rate and different
premium strategies.
Figure 2.4: Optimal premium for the year 2010 for company E for different premium
strategies.
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Chapter 3
Model’s enrichment with
company’s reputation and
elasticities
3.1 Motivation
Practically speaking, the general (non-life) insurance premium pricing strategy is mainly
based on the claim and business acquisition costs, the management expenses, the mar-
gin for fluctuation in claims experience and expected profits. According to Gulumser
et al. [31], companies offering products and services in the general insurance markets
are believed to trade under very competitive conditions. As a simple example, the case
of Australia has been studied, and the outcome suggests that in the general Australian
insurance industry, the firms operate in a somewhat perfect competitive environment
which depicts their demand and cost structure as well. Thus, competition affects the
equilibrium of the industry changing demand conditions. Consequently, it is clear that
the company’s optimal premium strategy, depends on the company’s demand,which is
also affected by competition.
This part of chapter 3 deals with two interesting questions. Actually, these will be
our motivation as it will become clearer in the next sections. Firstly, ”how can the
optimal premium strategy for an individual insurance company be calculated in a par-
ticular insurance market?” and secondly ”how is this strategy related to the competitive
insurance market?”.
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3.2 New Approach
With the present chapter, the volume of business is formed to be a general stochastic
demand function further extending chapter’s 2 suggestions making the model more
pragmatic and realistic. Thus, here for the very first time according to the author’s
knowledge, for the formulation of the volume of business, the company’s reputation
is also considered. According to [12], company’s reputation (or corporate reputation)
has a strong influence on buying decisions or in other words, on the demand of the
company’s product. In our case, the function for the volume of business, emphasizes the
ratio of the markets average to the company’s premium, the past year’s experience, the
company’s reputation and a stochastic disturbance. Additionally, following the existing
literature, the same linear discounted function for the wealth process of the company
is used, see also [18] and [61]. Moreover, the optimal premium can be calculated for
either negative or positive effect of the company’s reputation; which was not possible
with the previous model, see [61] and chapter 2.
As in [18], [71], [72], [61], the volume of business is directly connected to the com-
pany’s product demand function. Market’s demand for an insurance product is the
relationship between the product’s price and the product demanded by all customers.
In the model studied in this chapter, the volume of business function is derived from
the equilibrium points of the competitive market (perfect competition) which are de-
fined by the intersection of the demand and supply curves. These points determine
the contracts of general insurance that have been purchased, and its prices, which are
equal to the marginal cost of services. Generally, an approach of competitive behavior,
examines the revenue and cost structure of companies, using the framework of perfect
competition as a point of reference. Insurance firms operating under conditions of per-
fect competition are unable to absorb any of the cost increase. They are forced to pass
on the entire rise of input costs on output prices and revenue, leaving output unaffected.
In contrast, a rise in input prices, such as wages or administrative costs,under monop-
olistic conditions in equilibrium, results in a reduction of output and a rise in price
in a smaller scale than the increase in costs, leading to shrinked total revenue. Thus,
marginally profitable firms may be forced to leave the industry. Moreover the insurance
contracts are homogenous, customers face no quality differences, the transaction costs
are zero and both customers and insurance companies are fully informed.
In addition we present the analytical solutions for some common special cases, a
premium strategy concerning market’s average premium and an application.
This chapter is organized as follows: In section 3.3 a discrete-time model for the
insurance market is constructed. We discuss appropriate values for the model’s param-
eters and adopt suitable parameterizations. Moreover, in section 3.4 the calculation
of the optimal premium and the two main theorems are presented, both when the
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expected utility is being maximized and minimized, respectively. Therefore, for some
special cases, analytical forms for the optimal strategy are presented. Section 3.5 con-
siders an application with data based on the Greek insurance market and deals with
the applicability of the theoretical findings, the data’s presentation and analysis and a
premium strategy regarding market’s average premium.
3.3 Model Formulation
Following again Taylor’s [71], Emms et al. [18] and Pantelous and Passalidou [61], we
should make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: There is positive price-elasticity of demand, i.e. if the market as a
whole begins underwriting at a loss, any attempt by a particular insurer to maintain
profitability will result in a reduction of his volume of business.
Assumption 2: There is a finite time horizon.
Assumption 3: Demand in year k + 1 is assumed to be proportional to demand in
the preceding year k.
Additionally, we assume that the demand function is stochastic (because of θk and
p¯k) and we denote the wealth process wk as the insurer’s capital at time [k, k + 1), so
we obtain
wk+1 = −akwk + (pk − pik)Vk, (3.1)
where the sequence {ak}k∈N ∈ [0, 1] denotes the excess return on capital (i.e. return
on capital required by the shareholders of the insurer whose strategy is under consid-
eration). Thus, −akwk is the cost of holding wk in the time interval [k, k + 1).
Our aim is to determine the strategy that maximizes the expected total utility of
the wealth at time k over a finite time horizon T . As it has been also considered by
Emms et al. [18], we use a linear discounted function (of wealth) eq. (3.2).
Analytically, we want to maximize
max
pk
E
[
T∑
k=0
U(wk, k)
]
, (3.2)
where U(wk, k) = υ
kwk is the present value of the wealth wk.
Extending the previous literature, we assume that the function for the volume of
business is divided into two parts. Consistent with Taylor [71], the first part affects the
volume of business in year k+ 1 more significantly, since the demand is assumed to be
proportional to the demand of the preceding year k multiplied by
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f (pk, p¯k) = (pk/p¯k)
α with α > 0.
The parameter α (which has been assumed to be equal to 1 in [61] and chapter
2) models the responsiveness (or elasticity), of the company’s volume of business to a
change in premium in the preceding year k. Thus, we continue to propose that the
volume of business in year k + 1 is proportional to the ratio of the market’s average
premium to the company’s premium in year k + 1 changed by a particular sensitivity
parameter α. This important sensitivity factor is indicative of the degree to which a
change in this ratio and completion affects the volume of business, see also Lemma
1. According to Moody’s investor service report (May 2013)1, all-times high levels of
competition in general insurance industry challenge underwriting profitability, which
should lead to upward pressure on premiums across most lines of business.
Now, the second part has a smaller influence on the volume of business, since
it is related to the company’s reputation and the stochastic variable θk. Thus, it
incorporates different parameters related to the fame, reputation and to what extend
this reputation influences its volume of business. As a result of the severe financial
crisis in 2007-2008, nowadays buyers are more skeptical before purchasing any insurance
contract even if the premium is suspiciously very low, as there is a fear of losing money
due to a company’s potential bankruptcy. The Reputation Review 2012 by Oxford
Metrica2, which monitors the reputation performance in the world, and the role of
reputation in the professional service firms (University of Oxford, Novak Druce Centre
for Professional Service Firms vol.6) are two characteristic examples that show the
importance of the influental factor of reputation on a company’s demand.
Therefore, the company’s reliability is also considered very thoughtfully. The ef-
fects of reputation on the volume of business are modeled by the parameter γk, which
considers the company’s gains or losses in the market due to the reputation, and by the
sensitivity parameter β. It is an important factor for the volume’s of business elasticity
regarding a change in fame in the year, see also Lemma 2. The aforementioned sign
of γk is respectively positive and equal to +1 when the company has a good fame and
reputation or −1 for the opposite.
Additionally, the stochastic parameter θk is considered which comprises of all other
variables that are relevant to the demand function in year [k, k + 1). This stochastic
variable can take either positive or negative values. However, the volume of business will
be exponentially affected using the natural exponential function of θk, i.e. e
θk ∈ [0,∞).
1UK General Insurance Outlook
http : //www.actuarialpost.co.uk/downloads/cat1/UKGeneralInsuranceOutlook.pdf
2Oxford Metrica, Reputation Review 2012
http://www.aon.com/attachments/risk-services/Aon-OM-Reputation-Review-2012.pdf
2University of Oxford, Novak Druce Centre for Professional Service Firms vol.6
http : //www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/NovakDruce/Doc/TheroleofreputationinPSFs.pdf
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To summarize the discussion above, we can now assume that the volume of business is
given by
Vk = Vk−1
(
p¯k
pk
)α
+ sign(γk)|γk|βeθk , (3.3)
where eθk is being involved as an additive disturbance.
With the following lemmas, the premium and reputation elasticity of the volume of
business are provided. As we can easily observe, the sensitivity factors’, α and β, play
a key-role. The proofs of those Lemmas derive straightforwardly, and they are omitted.
Lemma 1. The premium elasticity of the volume of business is equal to
dVk
Vk
/
dpk
pk
= −αVk−1
Vk
(
p¯k
pk
)α
.
2
Lemma 2. Moreover the reputation elasticity to the volume of business is equal to
dVk
Vk
/
d |γk|
|γk| = sign (γk)β
|γk|βeθk
Vk
.
2
The derived formulas can test the sensitivity of the volume of business when partic-
ular changes of the premium and reputation occur as well as how and to what extent
the sensitivity factors α and β affect the volume of business. The calculation of the
optimal premium is given in the next sub-section.
3.4 Calculation of the Optimal Premium
In this sub-section, the premium p∗max,k, that the insurance company intends to charge
is calculated by maximizing the expected total utility of the wealth eq. (3.2) and (3.3),
both for sign(γk) = 1 and sign(γk) = −1, over a finite time horizon T , and over a
choice of strategies p. The next Theorem provides the optimal premium strategy for
the finite time horizon maximization problem eqs. (3.1) - (3.3), see also [40] and [49].
Theorem 2. For the wealth process {wk}k∈0,1,...,T−1 given by
wk+1 = −akwk + (pk − pik)
(
Vk−1
(
p¯k
pk
)α
+ sign (γk) |γk|βeθk
)
, (3.4)
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and for the maximization problem defined by
max
pk
E
[
T−1∑
i=k
υiwi
]
, (3.5)
with initial conditions w0, V0, V−1, a0, and γ0 the optimal strategy process p∗max,k is
given as a solution to the polynomial when
(a) α > 1,
pα+1k + b1pk + b2 = 0 and 0 < pk <
(
1 +
2
α− 1
)
pik, for k = 0, 1, ..., T − 1 (3.6)
(b) 0 < α ≤ 1,
pα+1k + b1pk + b2 = 0, for k = 0, 1, ....., T − 1, (3.7)
where b1 =
(1−α)Vk−1E(p¯αk )
sign(γk)|γk|βE(eθκ)
, b2 =
αpikVk−1E(p¯αk )
sign(γk)|γk|βE(eθκ)
(or b2 =
αpik
1−αb1, for α 6= 1), and
p¯k, pik is the average and the break-even premium respectively, in year k; Vk−1 is the
volume of exposure underwritten by the insurer in year k− 1, and E (eθk) is the expec-
tation of the natural exponential function of the (stochastic) disturbance θk in year k,
γk denotes the reputation effect in year k and the maximum value of eq. (3.5) is given
by
w0d0 + e0. (3.8)
Moreover, we define
dk = υ
k − akdk+1 > 0 and dT = 0, (3.9)
ek =
(
p∗max,k − pik
)Vk−1 E (p¯αk )(
p∗max,k
)α + sign (γk) |γk|βE(eϑk)
 dk+1 + ek+1,
and
eT = 0. (3.10)
Proof. First, let’s define
Jk(wk) , max
pk,pk+1,....,pT−1
E|wk
[
T−1∑
i=k
υiwi
]
. (3.11)
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Then, as it is known from [40], the optimal performance criterion satisfies the Bell-
man equation
Jk(wk) = max
pk
E|wk
{
υkwk + Jk+1(wk+1)
}
= max
pk
{
υkwk + E|wkJk+1(wk+1)
}
, (3.12)
where E|wk (p¯
α
k ) = E (p¯αk ) and E|wk
(
eθk
)
= E
(
eθk
)
, and JT (wT ) = wTdT + eT = 0; see
eqs. (3.9), (3.10) and (3.12).
We now show by induction that
Jk(wk) = wkdk + ek, (3.13)
solves (3.12) by noting that (3.13) is true for k = T and by assuming that (3.12) is
true for k + 1 and by proving is true for k. Substituting the assumed expression for
Jk+1(wk+1) into the right hand side (3.12) we obtain
Jk(wk) = max
pk
{
υkwk + E|wkJk+1(wk+1)
}
= max
pk
{
υkwk + E|wk(wk+1)dk+1 + ek+1
}
,
and from (3.4) we have
max
pk
{
υkwk +
[−akwk + (pk − pik)E|wkVk] dk+1 + ek+1} =
max
pk
{υkwk−akwkdk+1+dk+1 (pk − pik)
(
Vk−1
E (p¯αk )
pαk
+ sign (γk) |γk|βE
(
eϑk
))
+ek+1}.
(3.14)
The controller that maximizes the eq. (3.14), is given by eq. (3.6) or (3.7), since
A = wk
(
υk − akdk+1
)
+ dk+1 (pk − pik)
(
Vk−1
E (p¯αk )
pαk
+ sign (γk) |γk|βE
(
eϑk
))
+ ek+1
= wk
(
υk − akdk+1
)
+ pkVk−1
E (p¯αk )
pαk
dk+1 + sign (γk) pk|γk|βE
(
eϑk
)
dk+1
−pikVk−1E (p¯
α
k )
pαk
dk+1 − piksign (γk) |γk|βE
(
eϑk
)
dk+1 + ek+1.
The first derivative of A with respect to pk is given by
∂A
∂pk
= (1− α)Vk−1E (p¯
α
k )
pαk
dk+1 + sign (γk) |γk|βE
(
eϑk
)
dk+1 + αpikVk−1
E (p¯ak)
pα+1k
dk+1.
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If we equalize the first derivative with zero, i.e. ∂A∂pk = 0, we obtain
(1− α)Vk−1E (p¯
α
k )
pαk
dk+1 + sign (γk) |γk|βE
(
eϑk
)
dk+1 + αpikVk−1
E (p¯αk )
pα+1k
dk+1 = 0,
dk+1
[
(1− α)Vk−1E (p¯
α
k )
pαk
+ sign (γk) |γk|βE
(
eϑk
)
+ αpikVk−1
E (p¯αk )
pα+1k
]
= 0,
(1− α)Vk−1E (p¯
α
k )
pαk
+ sign (γk) |γk|βE
(
eϑk
)
+ αpikVk−1
E (p¯αk )
pα+1k
= 0,
sign (γk) |γk|βE
(
eϑk
)
pk
α+1 + (1− α)Vk−1E (p¯αk ) pk + αpikVk−1E (p¯αk ) = 0.
Finding the solution of the polynomial, see eq. (3.6) (or eq. (3.7)) and substituting
it into eq. (3.14) and then if we substitute eq. (3.9) and (3.10), we conclude that eq.
(3.14) is true.
The above expression gives the optimal strategy eq. (3.6) (or eq. (3.7)) when
∂A
∂2pk
= −αVk−1E (p¯αk ) dk+1p−(α+1)k
[
(1− α) + (α+ 1)pik
pk
]
< 0.
It is known that α, V k−1, E(p¯k)α, dk+1, p
−(α+1)
k are positive so two cases are derived:
(a) for α > 1: the optimal premium pricing strategy is derived when the inequality
0 < pk <
(
1 + 2α−1
)
pik holds. In other words, we have an upper bound for the optimal
premium that the company has to charge in year k. It is interesting to note that the
upper bound is related to the break-even premium and the elasticity parameter α.
(b) for 0 < α ≤ 1: we always have an optimal strategy.
Remark 5. Since the root of the polynomial given by eq. (3.6) (or eq. (3.7)) is the
optimal premium, it must be a real and positive number. Thus, we have to ensure that
the polynomial function (3.6) (or (3.7)) will have at least one real and positive root.
Thus, considering the Descartes’ rule of signs and elements of the polynomial theory,
in order to have at least one positive real root for the polynomial (3.6) (or (3.7)), the
sign variations in the sequence of coefficients of the polynomial must be two or one.
Then, if the polynomial has one sign variation, then it has exactly one positive real
root and if the polynomial has two sign variations, then it has either two or zero real
positive roots.
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More precisely, in the case that sign(γk) = 1, there are two possible sub-cases for
the polynomial’s coefficients:
• For α > 1, b1 < 0 and b2 > 0, the polynomial has two or zero positive roots.
• For 0 < α ≤ 1, b1 > 0 and b2 > 0, the polynomial has no positive root.
Moreover, in the case that sign(γk) = −1, there are also two possible sub-cases for
the polynomial’s coefficients (see also Remark 7):
• For α > 1 , b1 > 0 and b2 < 0, the polynomial has exactly one positive root.
• For 0 < α ≤ 1, b1 < 0 and b2 < 0, the polynomial has exactly one positive root.
Combing the Theorem’s 2 results and requesting at least one real positive root lead
to the following corollary which gives us three possible directions that guarantee the
existence of an optimal strategy, i.e. the calculation of the insurance premium:
Corollary 1. For the parameters of the Theorem 2, we have positive optimal solution,
p∗max,k:
I For sign(γk) = 1, with α > 1 and 0 < pk <
(
1 + 2α−1
)
pik, when the polynomial
(3.6) has two positive roots.
II For sign(γk) = −1 with 0 < α ≤ 1, when the polynomial (3.7) has exactly one
positive root.
III For sign(γk) = −1 with α > 1 and 0 < pk <
(
1 + 2α−1
)
pik, when the polynomial
(3.6) has exactly one positive root.
Remark 6. Let’s further investigate the case that sign(γk) = 1, and eventually the
polynomial (3.6) has zero positive roots (either for α > 1 or 0 < α ≤ 1). Since
Vk−1,
(
p¯k
pk
)α
, |γk|β and eθk are positive when sign(γκ) = 1, the company’s volume
of business increases as a result of the good fame as long as all the other parameters
remain unchanged, i.e. positive. Practically speaking, if the company’s reputation and
the parameter θk tend to be particularly high, i.e. go to positive infinity, the volume of
business will tend to be positive infinite as well. Thus, in this case, the wealth function
(3.1) will increase as well, and tend to infinity too, as the excess return on capital is
small, corresponding to the product of the difference between pk and the break-even
premium pik multiplied by the volume of business.
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Consequently, as it derives from Remark 6, when the company has a very good
reputation, and the factor 0 < α ≤ 1 or α > 1 (without a positive root), the optimal
premium cannot be defined by solving another maximization problem. In other words,
the company is very flexible to choose any premium it wishes, since the very good
reputation guarantee the increase of its profits. Obviously, as it has been also discussed
by Pantelous and Passalidou [61], the previous year premium strategy, i.e. pk−1 is
characterized as a very successful choice, so the company can preserve it for one more
year. However, it might also be useful to calculate the minimum excess premium
strategy, p˜∗min,k, that the company could charge in order to have a positive expected
wealth (3.1) and to stay competitive in the insurance market.
Thus, the next theorem provides an upper bound for the optimal premium strategy,
the minimum premium excess strategy process p˜∗min,k, when the company is targeting
a particular wealth {Wk}k∈0,1,...,T−1 for the finite time horizon minimization problem,
eqs. (3.15) - (3.16), see also [40] and [49] when sign(γκ) = 1 and α > 0.
Theorem 3. For the wealth process {wk}k∈0,1,...,T−1 given by
wk+1 = −akwk + (pik + p˜k)
(
Vk−1
(
p¯k
p˜k
)α
+ |γk|βeθk
)
, (3.15)
where α > 0 and for the minimization problem defined by
min
pk
E
[
T−1∑
i=k
υi(Wi − wi)
]
, (3.16)
with initial conditions w0, V0, V−1, a0, γ0 and targeted wealth {Wk}k∈0,1,...,T−1, the
minimum premium excess strategy process p˜∗min,k is given by
p˜α+1k + b˜1p˜k + b˜2 = 0 and
(
1 +
2
α− 1
)
pik < p˜k, for k = 0, 1, ..., T − 1 (3.17)
where b˜1 = − (1−α)Vk−1E(p¯
a
k)
|γk|βE(eθκ)
, b˜2 = −apikVk−1E(p¯
a
k)
|γk|βE(eθκ)
or apik1−a b˜1 when a 6= 1. The parame-
ters p¯k, pik, Vk−1 and E
(
eθk
)
have been defined in Theorem 2. Then, the minimum
value of (3.15) is given by
(W0 − w0) d0 + ε0. (3.18)
Moreover, we define
dk = υ
k − akdk+1 > 0 and dT = 0, (3.19)
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εk = akdk+1Wk +Wk+1dk+1 − p˜∗min,kVk−1
E (p¯ak)(
p˜∗min,k
)adk+1
−p˜∗min,k|γk|βE
(
eϑk
)
dk+1 − pikVk−1 E (p¯
a
k)(
p˜∗min,k
)adk+1 − pik|γk|βE(eϑk) dk+1 + εk+1,
and
eT = 0. (3.20)
Proof. First, let’s define
Jk(Wk − wk) , min
p˜k,p˜k+1,....,p˜T−1
E|wk
[
T−1∑
i=k
υi(Wi − wi)
]
. (3.21)
Then, the Bellman equation is given by
Jk(wk) = min
p˜k
{
υk(Wk − wk) + E|wkJk+1(Wk+1 − wk+1)
}
, (3.22)
where E|wk (p¯
α
k ) = E (p¯αk ) and E|wk
(
eθk
)
= E
(
eθk
)
, and JT (WT − wT ) = (WT − wT )dT+
eT = 0; see eqs. (3.19), (3.20) and (3.22).
We now show by induction that
Jk(Wk − wk) = (Wk − wk)dk + ek, (3.23)
solves (3.22) by noting that (3.23) is true for k = T and by assuming that (3.22) is
true for k + 1 and by proving is true for k. Substituting the assumed expression for
Jk+1(Wk+1 − wk+1) into the right hand side (3.22) we obtain
Jk(wk) = min
p˜k
{
υk(Wk − wk) + E|wk(Wk+1 − wk+1)dk+1 + ek+1
}
,
and from (3.4) we have
min
p˜k
{(Wk − wk)
(
υk − akdk+1
)
+Wkakdk+1 +Wk+1dk+1
−dk+1 (pik + p˜k)
(
Vk−1
E (p¯αk )
p˜αk
+ |γk|βE
(
eϑk
))
+ εk+1}
(3.24)
The controller that minimizes the above expression, eq. (3.24), is given by eq. (3.6) or
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(3.7), since
A = (Wk − wk)
(
υk − akdk+1
)
+Wkakdk+1 +Wk+1dk+1
−p˜kVk−1E (p¯
α
k )
p˜αk
dk+1 − p˜k|γk|βE
(
eϑk
)
dk+1
− pikVk−1E (p¯
α
k )
p˜αk
dk+1 − pik|γk|βE
(
eϑk
)
dk+1 + εk+1.
The first derivative of A with respect to p˜k is given by
∂A
∂p˜k
= (1− a)Vk−1E (p¯
a
k)
p˜ak
dk+1 − |γk|βE
(
eϑk
)
dk+1 + αpikVk−1
E (p¯αk )
p˜α+1k
dk+1.
If we equalize the first derivative with zero, i.e. ∂A∂p˜k = 0, we obtain
|γk|βE
(
eϑk
)
p˜α+1k − (1− α)Vk−1E (p¯αk ) p˜k − αpikVk−1E (p¯αk ) = 0
Finding the solution of the polynomial, see eq. (3.6) (or eq. (3.7)) and substituting it
into eq. (3.24) and then if we substitute eq. (3.19) and eq. (3.20), we conclude to the
fact that eq. (3.23) is true. The above expression gives the optimal strategy, see eq.
(3.7) as
∂A
∂2p˜k
= −αVk−1E (p¯αk ) dk+1p˜−(α+1)k
[
(1− α) + (α+ 1)pik
p˜k
]
> 0.
Remark 7. It appears that, the optimal premium strategy given by eq. (3.18) derives
quite naturally using elements of dynamic programming. Thus, as in [61], the optimal
strategy depends endogenously on the previous year’s volume of business, the break-
even premium rate, the expected value of the average premium rate, the company’s
fame and reputation, and the expected value of the natural exponential function of the
variable θk.
Remark 8. Since the root of the polynomial given by eq. (3.17) is the optimal pre-
mium, it must be again a real and positive number. Thus, considering the fundamental
Descartes’ rule of signs and elements of the polynomial theory, the sign variations in
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the sequence of coefficients of the polynomial (3.17) appears to be one (either + + - or
+ - -), and thus, it has always exactly one positive real root.
In the remaining part of section 3.4, some special cases for the parameter α are con-
sidered, when analytical formulae for the root of polynomial (3.6) (or (3.7) or (3.17))
is derived.
First case : When α = 1, 2, 3..... ∈ N
Proposition 4. For α = 1, then the optimal premium is given by
p∗max,k =
√
Vk−1pikE (p¯k)
|γk|βE (eθk)
∈ R+ when sign(γk) = −1.
Proof. For α = 1 then eq. (3.6) is equal to
p2max,k +
pikVk−1E (p¯k)
sign(γk)|γk|βE (eθk)
= 0⇔ p∗max,k =
√
pikVk−1E (p¯k)
|γk|βE (eθk)
.
when sign(γk) = −1.
The above expression gives always the optimal strategy since
∂A
∂2pk
= −Vk−1E (p¯k) dk+1p−2k 2
pik
pk
< 0.
Remark 9. This is the optimal premium that has derived in Theorem 1; see [61] and
chapter 2.
Proposition 5. For α = 2 , then the optimal premium is given by
p∗max,k = ν1 + ν2, when ∆ > 0 and pk < 3pik,
where ν1 = sign(w1)
3
√|w1| , ν2 = sign(w2) 3√|w2|, sign(wi) =

1 if wi > 0
−1 if wi < 0
0 if wi = 0
 ,
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and w1, w2 are the roots of the equation w
2 − 2pikb1w − b
3
1
27 = 0, and
∆ = pi2kb
2
1 +
4
27
b1
3, b1 = −
Vk−1E
(
p¯2k
)
sign(γk)|γk|βE (eθκ)
, b2 =
2pikVk−1E
(
p¯2k
)
sign(γk)|γk|βE (eθκ)
= −2pikb1.
Proof. For α = 2 then eq. (3.6) is equal to
p3k + b1pk − 2pikb1 = 0.
Now, following Cardano’s method3 we substitute pk = u+ z, then we take
p3k = u
3 + z3 + 3uz (u+ z) ,
and the equation above is equal to
u3+z3+3uz (u+ z)+b1 (u+ z)−2pikb1 = 0⇔
(
u3 + z3 − 2pikb1
)
+(u+ z) (3uz + b1) = 0.
Thus, all the pairs (u, z) that verify the system
u3 + z3 − 2pikb1 = 0
3uz + b1 = 0
 are solutions.
Moreover,
u3 + z3 − 2pikb1 = 0
3uz + b1 = 0
⇒ u3 + z3 = 2pikb1uz = − b13
⇒
 u3 + z3 = 2pikb1u3z3 = − b3127 .
Obviously, u3, z3 are roots of the equation w2−2pikb1w− b
3
1
27 = 0, where ∆ = pi
2
kb
2
1+
4
27b1
3.
When ∆ = pi2kb
2
1+
4
27b1
3 > 0, eq. (3.6) has two real solutions w1, w2 ∈ R and the optimal
strategy is given by p∗k = ν1 + ν2, where
v1 = sign(w1)
3
√
|w1|, v2 = sign(w2) 3
√
|w2| and sign(wi) =

1 if wi > 0
−1 if wi < 0
0 if wi = 0
.
In order to have an optimal strategy ∂A
∂2pk
= −2Vk−1E(p¯k)2 dk+1p3k
[
−1 + 3pikpk
]
must be
below zero from where the condition pk < 3pik is derived.
3Jacobson, Nathan (2009), Basic algebra 1 (2nd ed.), Dover, p.210
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Remark 10. When sign(γk) = 1, and b1 < 0, then ∆ = pi
2
kb
2
1 +
4
27b1
3 can take any
value, and the polynomial given by eq. (3.6) has two sign changes and two or zero
positive real roots.
However, when sign(γk) = −1, b1 > 0 , then ∆ = pi2kb21 + 427b13 > 0 , the polynomial
given by eq. (3.6) has one sign change and exactly one positive real root.
Proposition 6. For α = 3, then the optimal premium is given by
• p∗max,k1 = 12
(
k +
√
∆2
)
,
• p∗max,k2 = 12
(
k −√∆2
)
,
• p∗max,k3 = 12
(
k +
√
∆3
)
,
• p∗max,k4 = 12
(
k −√∆3
)
,
when p∗max,k1, p
∗
max,k2
, p∗max,k3, p
∗
max,k4
∈ R+ and p∗max,k < 2pik, where ∆2 = k2 −
4g, ∆3 = k
2 − 4h, k = √v1 + v2, g = v1 + v2 − b1k , h = v1 + v2 + b1k , and v1 =
sign(w1)
3
√|w1| and v2 = sign(w2) 3√|w2|, where sign(wi) =

1 if wi > 0
−1 if wi < 0
0 if wi = 0
, and
w1, w2 are the roots of the equation w
2−b21w−8(pikb1)3 = 0, and b1 = −2 Vk−1E(p¯k)
3
sign(γk)|γk|βE(p¯k)α
,
b2 =
3pikVk−1E(p¯k)3
sign(γk)|γk|βE(eθk)
= −32b1.
Proof. For α = 3, then the eq. (3.6) is equal to
p4k + b1pk −
3
2
pikb1 = 0 where b1 = −2 Vk−1E(p¯k)
3
sign(γk)|γk|βE(p¯k)α
, b2 =
3pikVk−1E(p¯k)3
sign(γk)|γk|βE (eθk)
.
According to Descrates-Euler-Cardano4 algorithm, in order to solve the quartic
equation, we first need to solve a particular cubic equation, the coefficients of which
are derived from those of quartic. A root of the cubic is then used to factorize the quartic
into quadratics, which is solved. Following the above algorithm, we use a subsidiary
cubic with the coefficients: y3 − 4 (−32pikb1) y − b21 = 0⇔ y3 + 6pikb1y − b21 = 0.
4Solving quartics and cubics for graphics, Dr Don Herbison-Evans, The university of Sydney (1994)
http://sydney.edu.au/engineering/it/research/tr/tr487.pdf
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Following again Cardano’s method (see proof of proposition 2) this cubic polynomial
w2 − b21w −
(6pikb1)
3
27
= 0⇔ w2 − b21w − 8(pikb1)3 = 0.
The discriminant of this quadratic equation is equal to
∆ = (b1)
4 + 4 ∗ 8(pikb1)3 = 0⇔ ∆ = (b1)4 + 32(pikb1)3 = 0.
When ∆ = (b1)
4 + 32(pikb1)
3 > 0, eq. (3.6) has two real solutions w1, w2 ∈ R and the
solution of the cubic polynomial is given by p∗k = ν1 + ν2, where v1 = sign(w1)
3
√|w1|
and v2 = sign(w2)
3
√|w2| where
sign(wi) =

1 if wi > 0
−1 if wi < 0
0 if wi = 0.
In this algorithm the solution of the quartic is obtained by the quadratics:
p2k + kpk + g = 0 and p
2
k − kpk + h = 0.
where k = (y)1/2, g = y − b1k , h = y + b1k .
Remark 11. When sign(γk) = 1, and b1 < 0, the polynomial which is given by
eq. (3.6) has two sign changes and two or zero positive real roots. However, when
sign(γk) = −1, b1 > 0, the polynomial which is given by eq. (3.6) has one sign change
and exactly one positive real root.
Remark 12. For α > 3, no general formula exists (or more precisely, no formula in
terms of addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, arbitrary constants and n-th
roots). This result is proved in Galois Theory and is known as the Abel-Ruffini theorem.
Nevertheless, finding solutions to higher order polynomial formulas is affordable using
numerical methods, e.g., Newton’s method.
Second case: When sign(γk) = −1 and α ∈ (0, 1).
If we write α as a ratio of numbers i.e. α = κ/λ, κ < λ, λ 6= 0 and κ, λ = 1, 2.... ∈ N
57
and we substitute this ratio into eq. (3.6), then we will get the following function
p
κ/λ+1
k + b1pk + b2 = 0⇔ p
κ+λ
λ
k + b1pk + b2 = 0⇔
(
p
1/λ
k
)κ+λ
+ b1pk + b2.
If we pose p
1/λ
k = y, y > 0 then pk = y
λ, pk, y > 0. Then the above polynomial is equal
to yκ+λ + b1y
λ + b2 = 0 and for κ + λ = 1, 2, 3, 4 there is a general formula for the
polynomial’s solution. For κ+ λ > 5 see Remark 11.
In the next section, the numerical algorithm is presented and an interesting appli-
cation is considered.
3.5 Numerical Application
3.5.1 Data
In order to illustrate the main theoretical findings of this paper, a numerical example
based on data from the Greek Automobile Insurance market is presented; see also [61].
Unfortunately, the real data publicly available is not analytic and several assumptions
have to be made, leading us to subjective numerical results which illustrate only the
applicability of our methodology.
The Greek insurance market, see [61], is an oligopoly comprising of less than 10 key-
companies. However, for the purpose of this application, we will focus our attention on
the main three companies. So, the approximate number of contracts for the 3 major
non-life Greek insurance companies for a standard six-month cover of a 10-year old,
1300cc car (with 2.000 Euros covered amount) is presented for the year 2013 in table
1.
Insurance Companies Volume of business
A 1,290,320
B 736,621
C 548.861
Table 3.1: The volume of business (i.e. number of contracts) for the automobile insur-
ance market for the three main Greek companies in 2013.
Empirically speaking, see Table 3.15 in [61], the elasticity parameter, α, for A, B
and C insurance companies has been estimated and assumed to be equal to 5, 2 and 2
respectively.
5The financial crisis in 2008 has revealed structural weaknesses in the Greek insurance and financial
environment, and thus several companies from those sectors have decided lastly to be emerged. How-
ever, as this is just a numerical application for illustrating further the applicability of our theoretical
findings, we believe that more justification is not necessary, and it is omitted.
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In the next sub-section, the methodology for calculating the average premium is
considered and then the algorithm for the optimum pricing stategy is provided.
3.5.2 Premium Strategy: A Generic Multiplicative process for the
Market’s Average Premium
As it has been considered in [17], [18] and [61], the optimal premium strategy can be
calculated only if the average premium process is defined appropriately. Indeed, in the
existing main literature, Emms et al. [18] have assumed a simple geometric stochastic
differential equation for the evolution of the average premium into a continuous-time
framework. However, in our approach the expectation (first moment) of the market’s
average premium needs to be calculated, and in order to make it more realistic, we will
further assume that the market’s average premium process has some kind of ”memory”
or is related to the past year experience. In this way, we have the flexibility to model
other kind of macroeconimic events, such as emerges in the market, increment in taxes
etc. Consequently, using a point process is an effective way to model the average
premium. Point processes with noise 1/f were introduced in 1998 by Kaulakys et al.
[44] and later on, they were generalized for 1/fβ for 0.5 < β < 2, see Kaulakys et al. [45].
Influenced by this model, we can adopt the main idea and adjust it to our model. Thus,
the market’s average premium values can be represented as a sequence of correlated
pulses or series of events, i.e.
x (p¯) = a¯
∑
k
δ (p¯− p¯k), (3.25)
where δ (p¯) is the Dirac δ-function and a¯ is an average contribution to the signal x(p¯)
of one event. Additionally, there is a generic multiplicative process for the market’s
average premium
p¯k = p¯k−1 + γp¯
2µ−1
k−1 + σp¯
µ
k−1εk, (3.26)
generating the power law distributed Pk (p¯k) ∼ p¯αk , α = 2γσ2 − 2µ sequence of the
average premium values p¯k in k-space and 1/fβ power spectral density of the signal
(3.25), S (f) ∼ 1
fβ
, β = 1 + α3−2µ . In this approach the average market’s premium
fluctuates due to the random perturbations by a sequence of uncorrelated normally
distributed random variable {εk} with zero expectation and unit variance; σ is the
standard deviation of the white noise and γ is the coefficient of the non-linear damping.
In the Figure 3.1, a realistic presentation of the market’s average premium is pro-
vided. Thus, as it will be assumed in the numerical part of this section, for µ = 0.5,
σ = 0.2 and γ = 2 into eq. (3.26), the market’s average premium is 281.21 Euros in
2013 for a standard six-month cover of a 10-year old, 1300cc car (with 2.000 Euros
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Figure 3.1: A realization of the market’s average premium assuming that it was 190
Euros in 1990 for a standard six-month cover of a 10-year old, 1300cc car (with 2.000
Euros covered amount).
covered amount). The following calculations are based on this assumption, see also
table 3.2.
Values for α E (p¯ak)
1 283.21
2 80,489.11
5 1,885,856,128,571.30
Table 3.2: The values of E (p¯ak) for different α and market’s average premium 281.21
Euros for 2013.
3.5.3 Numerical Algorithm
Summarizing the discussion in Section 3.3, in this sub-section, the algorithmic steps
for the calculation of the optimal premium are described.
Step 1: Collect the necessary (historical) data from the insurance market.
The first step requires the collection of data concerning the number of companies which
are in the market, the volume of business, Vk−1, and the break-even premium, pik, from
each company for the previous and current financial year, respectively. Moreover, the
impact of the reputation, γk, and the other stochastic parameters, θk, need to be esti-
mated. Obviously, as it will also be the case later, the last two parameters might be
unknown or not easily estimated, so different scenarios need to be considered from the
insurance company’s point of view and strategy design, see also next subsection. Then,
step 2 follows.
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Step 2: Estimate parameter α.
Based on historical data one can estimate parameter α of the eq. (3.3) for each com-
pany using data fitting tools. The parameter is a good indication about the elasticity
of the market’s average premium over the company’s premium. Then, step 3 follows.
Step 3: Estimate the parameters of market’s average premium process, p¯k.
As it has been assumed in the previous sub-section, the average premium can be mod-
elled as a point process, see eq. (3.2). Again with the appropriate data fitting, param-
eters γ, µ and σ for α > 1 are calculated. Thus, the moments for p¯k, i.e. E (p¯ak) are
derived. Then, step 4 follows.
Step 4: Calculate the coefficients b1 and b2 of the polynomial (3.6) (or (3.7)).
Using the estimated parameter α and the information collected in step 1, the coeffi-
cients b1 and b2 can be estimated, then step 5 follows.
Step 5: Calculate the roots of the polynomial (3.6) (or (3.7)).
I For sign(γk) = 1, with α > 1 and 0 < pk <
(
1 + 2α−1
)
pik, then the polynomial
(2.6) has zero or two positive roots.
II For sign(γk) = −1 with 0 < α ≤ 1 , then the polynomial (3.7) has exactly one
positive root.
III For sign(γk) = −1 with α > 1 and 0 < pk <
(
1 + 2α−1
)
pik, then the polynomial
(2.6) has exactly one positive root.
The main possible directions for this step are related to the negative or positive effect
of the reputation on the volume of business. There are many different ways in order to
”measure” the reputation effects, such as sentiment analysis, purchase intent, opinion
polls etc. Consequently, when we are able to determine the impact of the reputation,
one of the above three possible cases is considered further (see also Corollary 1). Then,
step 6 follows.
Step 6: Design and agreement on the optimal premium strategy for the insurance
company.
Now, for different values of the elasticity parameter β (or/and break-even premium, pik
or/and the effect of reputation, γk; see also Step 1) the actuary can generate different
values for the optimal premium after solving the polynomial mentioned in step 4; see
also Proposition 2, 3, 4 and the second case in section 3.3. Then after taking into consid-
eration the competition in the current (or targeting) insurance market, the reputation
of the company, the break-even premium, expectation of the different macroeconomic
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parameters (i.e. based on the random variable, θk). Finally, the optimal premium is
calculated and agreed by the senior management of the companies.
In the next sub-section, the numerical calculations are provided for the insurance
companies A, B and C.
3.5.4 Numerical Calculations and Discussion
For Steps 1, 2 and 3, it is assumed that the market’s average premium is 281.21 Euros
in 2013 for a standard six-month cover of a 10-year old, 1300cc car (with 2.000 Euros
covered amount), the elasticity parameter, α, for A, B and C insurance companies has
been estimated and assumed to be equal to 5, 2 and 2 respectively, and the break-even
premium takes a range of values from 200 to 240 Euros, i.e. around 60 − 70% of the
average premium.
3.5.5 Optimal premium for different values of β
Then, the following scenarios are considered for companies A, B and C for nega-
tive/positive reputation, and β = 2, 1.5, 1 and 0.5. In the first scenario (see Figure
3.2, 3.4 and 3.5), the companies’ reputation has negative effect on the volume of their
business, since sign(γk) = −1, |γk| = 2, and E
(
eθκ
)
= 59, 874. Thus, for β = 2, 1.5,
1 and 0.5, the company is approximately losing 239,496, 169,349, 119,748 and 84,674
contracts respectively. In the second scenario (see Figure 3.3), the companies’ reputa-
tion has positive effect on the volume of business, since sign(γk) = 1, also |γk| = 2,
and E
(
eθκ
)
= 59, 874. Thus, for β = 2, 1.5, 1 and 0.5, the company is approximately
gaining 239,496, 169,349, 119,748 and 84,674 contracts respectively.
I) Starting with company A, the volume of business (i.e. 1,290,320 contracts, see
table 3.1 is very elastic to one potential change of the ratio of the company’s average
premium to the company’s premium since the factor α is equal to 5. In the first scenario
(see Figure 3.2), the company’s reputation has negative effect on the volume of business,
then, b1 > 0 and b2 < 0, so one positive solution for the polynomial (3.6) is obtained,
see also Corollary 1. In Figure 3.2 and table 3.3, the premium takes different values
depending on the different level of the break even premium. As expected the premium
of the leading company of the Greek insurance market, can be discounted significantly
when the break even premium is lower, and our approach recommends lower values
when β = 2, i.e. when it loses bigger part of the market.
In the second scenario (see Figure 3.3 and table 3.4), the company’s reputation
has positive effect on the volume of business, then, b1 < 0 and b2 > 0, so two or zero
positive solutions for the polynomial (3.6) are expected, see also Corollary 1. In our
case, there is positive root, and as also expected, the premium takes higher values
compared to the first scenario and can be discounted significantly when the break even
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pik 200e 205e 210e 215e 220e 225e 230e 235e 240e
β = 0.5 247,98 253,92 259,82 265,69 271,51 277,30 283,03 288,71 294,34
β = 1 247,19 253,02 258,80 264,53 270,21 275,83 281,39 286,89 292,32
β = 1.5 246,13 251,81 257,44 262,99 268,48 273,90 279,25 284,52 289,71
β = 2 244,72 250,21 255,63 260,98 266,24 271,41 276,50 281,51 286,42
Table 3.3: The premium of the insurance company A for sign(γk) = −1, different
values of β and for the break-even premium pik.
Figure 3.2: The premium of the insurance company A for sign(γk) = −1, different
values of β and for the break-even premium.
premium is lower, and our approach recommends higher values when β = 2, i.e. when
it gains bigger part of the market. In both cases, for some break even premiums the
recommended premium is significantly lower than the average premium, giving a good
indication of the leading position of this company.
pik 200e 205e 210e 215e 220e 225e 230e 235e 240e
β = 0.5 252,24 258,87 265,55 272,30 279,11 286,01 293,00 300,11 307,33
β = 1 253,25 260,06 266,95 273,95 281,07 288,32 295,73 303,33 311,17
β = 1.5 254,76 261,86 269,11 276,53 284,16 292,04 300,25 308,85 317,99
β = 2 257,11 264,72 272,60 280,82 289,48 298,74 308,86 320,34 334,42
Table 3.4: The premium of insurance company A for sign(γk) = 1, different values of
β and for the break-even premium pik.
II) Continuing with company B, the volume of business (i.e. 736,621 contracts, see
table 3.1) is less elastic to the previous one, since the factor α is equal to 2. In the first
scenario (see Figure 3.4 and table 3.5), the company’s reputation has negative effect
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Figure 3.3: The premium of insurance company A for sign(γk) = 1, different values of
β and for the break-even premium pik.
on the volume of business, then b1 > 0 and b2 < 0, so one positive solution for the
polynomial (3.6) is obtained, see also Corollary 1. In Figure 3.4, the premium depends
on the different level of the break even premium and changes accordingly. Again for the
2nd biggest company of the Greek insurance market, the premium can be discounted
significantly when the break even premium is lower, and our approach recommends
lower values when β = 2, i.e. when it loses bigger part of the market. For all the
different values of break even premiums, the recommended premium is significantly
higher than the average premium, giving a good indication of the struggling position of
this company when suffering big losses to the volume of its business. For the positive
effect in the company’s reputation to the volume of business b1 < 0 and b2 > 0, and it
can be shown that zero positive solutions for the polynomial (3.6) are derived. Thus,
the senior management of the company can keep the same premium strategy with the
previous year.
pik 200e 205e 210e 215e 220e 225e 230e 235e 240e
β = 0.5 342,58 349,19 355,72 362,16 368,52 374,80 381,01 387,14 393,19
β = 1 328,44 334,45 340,36 346,20 351,95 357,62 363,22 374,19 379,56
β = 1.5 312,68 318,08 323,39 328,63 333,78 338,86 343,86 348,80 353,66
β = 2 295,63 300,45 305,18 309,84 314,43 318,94 323,39 332,08 336,33
Table 3.5: The premium of insurance company B for sign(γk) = −1, different values
of β and for the break-even premium pik.
III) Finally for company C, the volume of business (i.e. 548.861 contracts, see table
3.1) is equally elastic to the previous one, since the factor α is also 2. In the first
64
Figure 3.4: The premium of insurance company B for sign(γk) = −1, different values
of β and for the break-even premium pik.
scenario (see Figure 3.5), the company’s reputation has negative effect on the volume
of business, then b1 > 0 and b2 < 0, so one positive solution for the polynomial (3.6)
is obtained, see also Corollary 1. In Figure 3.5 and 3.6, the premium’s values changes
according to the different level of the break even premium. Again for the 3rd biggest
company of the Greek insurance market, the premium can be discounted significantly
when the break even premium is lower, and our approach recommends lower values
when β = 2, i.e. when it loses bigger part of the market. For all the different values of
break even premiums, the recommended premium is higher than the average premium,
but it is lower when compared to that of Company B. This is a very interesting result
as company B and C have common elasticity factors and their volumes are comparable.
Thus, as company C has less contracts compared to company B, it reduces a little more
the recommended premium in order to retake the lost volume. Again for the positive
effect in the company’s reputation to the volume of business b1 < 0 and b2 > 0, and it
can be also shown that zero positive solutions for the polynomial (3.6) is derived. Thus,
the senior management of the company can keep the same premium strategy with the
previous year.
3.5.6 Optimal premium for diferrent values of |γk|
Then, the following scenarios are considered for companies A, B and C for nega-
tive/positive reputation, and |γk| = 2, 1.5, 1 and 0.5. Again in the first scenario (see
Figure 3.6, 3.8 and 3.9), the companies’ reputation has negative effect on the volume
of their business, since sign(γk) = −1, β = 2, and E
(
eθκ
)
= 59, 874. Thus, for |γk| =
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pik 200e 205e 210e 215e 220e 225e 230e 235e 240e
β = 0.5 330,69 336,78 342,79 348,72 354,56 360,33 366,02 371,63 377,16
β = 1 315,15 320,64 326,05 331,37 336,61 341,78 346,87 351,89 356,84
β = 1.5 298,27 303,18 308,00 312,74 317,41 322,01 326,53 330,99 335,38
β = 2 280,44 284,79 289,06 293,26 297,40 301,47 305,47 309,41 313,29
Table 3.6: The premium of insurance company C for sign(γk) = −1, different values
of β and for the break-even premium pik.
Figure 3.5: The premium of insurance company C for sign(γk) = −1, different values
of β and for the break-even premium pik.
2, 1.5, 1 and 0.5, the company is approximately losing 239,496, 134,717, 59,874 and
14,969 contracts respectively. In the second scenario (see Figure 3.7), the companies’
reputation has positive effect on the volume of business, since sign(γk) = 1, also β = 2,
and E
(
eθκ
)
= 59, 874. Thus, for |γk| = 2, 1.5, 1 and 0.5, the company is approximately
gaining 239,496, 134,717, 59,874 and 14,969 contracts respectively.
I) Starting with company A, as we have said earlier the volume of business (i.e.
1,290,320 contracts, see table 3.1) is very elastic to one potential change of the ratio of
the company’s average premium to the company’s premium since the factor α is equal
to 5. In the first scenario (see Figure 3.6 and 3.7), the company’s reputation has nega-
tive effect on the volume of business, then, b1 > 0 and b2 < 0, so one positive solution
for the polynomial (2.6) is obtained, see also Corollary 1. In Figure 3.6 and table 3.7,
the premium takes different values depending on the different level of the break even
premium. As expected the premium of the leading company of the Greek insurance
market, can be discounted significantly when the break even premium is lower, and our
approach recommends lower values when |γk| = 2, i.e. when it loses bigger part of the
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market.
pik 200e 205e 210e 215e 220e 225e 230e 235e 240e
|γk| = 0.5 249,63 255,82 262,00 268,18 274,34 280,50 286,65 292,78 298,90
|γk| = 1 248,55 254,58 260,57 266,54 272,48 278,39 284,25 290,08 295,87
|γk| = 1.5 246,87 252,65 258,38 264,06 269,68 275,23 280,73 286,15 291,51
|γk| = 2 244,72 250,21 255,63 260,98 266,24 271,41 276,50 281,51 286,42
Table 3.7: The premium of the insurance company A for sign(γk) = −1, different
values of γ and for the break-even premium pik.
Figure 3.6: The premium of the insurance company A for sign(γk) = −1, different
values of |γk| and for the break-even premium pik.
In the second scenario (see Figure 3.7), the company’s reputation has positive effect
on the volume of business, then, b1 < 0 and b2 > 0, so two or zero positive solutions for
the polynomial (3.6) are expected, see also Corollary 1. In our case, there is positive
root, and as also expected, the premium takes higher values compared to the first sce-
nario and can be discounted significantly when the break even premium is lower, and
our approach recommends higher values when |γk| = 2 see also table 3.8, i.e. when
it gains bigger part of the market. In both cases, for some break even premiums the
recommended premium is significantly lower than the average premium, giving a good
indication of the leading position of this company.
II) Continuing with company B, the volume of business (i.e. 736,621 contracts, see
table 3.1) is less elastic to the previous one, since the factor α is equal to 2. In the first
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pik 200e 205e 210e 215e 220e 225e 230e 235e 240e
|γk| = 0.5 250,38 256,69 263,01 269,34 275,67 282,02 288,38 294,76 301,15
|γk| = 1 251,56 258,07 264,61 271,20 277,83 284,51 291,26 298,06 304,95
|γk| = 1.5 253,69 260,58 267,58 274,70 281,95 289,38 297,00 304,86 313,02
|γk| = 2 257,11 264,72 272,60 280,82 289,48 298,74 308,86 320,34 334,42
Table 3.8: (The premium of the insurance company A for sign(γk) = 1, different values
of |γk| and for the break-even premium pik).
Figure 3.7: The premium of the insurance company A for sign(γk) = 1, different values
of |γk| and for the break-even premium pik.
scenario (see Figure 3.8 and table 3.9), the company’s reputation has negative effect
on the volume of business, then b1 > 0 and b2 < 0, so one positive solution for the
polynomial (3.6) is obtained, see also Corollary 1. In Figure 3.8, the premium depends
on the different level of the break even premium and changes accordingly. Again for the
2nd biggest company of the Greek insurance market, the premium can be discounted
significantly when the break even premium is lower, and our approach recommends
lower values when |γk| = 2, i.e. when it loses bigger part of the market. For all the
different values of break even premiums, the recommended premium is significantly
higher than the average premium, giving a good indication of the struggling position of
this company when suffering big losses to the volume of its business. For the positive
effect in the company’s reputation to the volume of business b1 < 0 and b2 > 0, and it
can be shown that zero positive solutions for the polynomial (3.6) are derived. Thus,
the senior management of the company can keep the same premium strategy with the
previous year.
III) Finally for company C, the volume of business (i.e. 548.861 contracts, see table
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pik 200e 205e 210e 215e 220e 225e 230e 235e 240e
|γk|=0.5 385,53 394,50 403,42 412,30 421,14 429,94 438,69 447,39 456,05
|γk|=1 354,87 362,07 369,19 376,22 383,18 390,07 396,87 410,26 416,85
|γk|=1.5 323,25 329,05 334,76 340,39 345,94 351,40 356,80 362,11 367,36
|γk|=2 295,63 300,45 305,18 309,84 314,43 318,94 323,39 332,08 336,33
Table 3.9: The premium of insurance company B for sign(γk) = −1, different values
of |γk| and for the break-even premium pik.
Figure 3.8: The premium of insurance company B for sign(γk) = −1, different values
of |γk| and for the break-even premium pik.
3.1) is equally elastic to the previous one, since the factor α is also 2. In the first
scenario (see Figure 3.8 and table 3.10), the company’s reputation has negative effect
on the volume of business, then b1 > 0 and b2 < 0, so one positive solution for the
polynomial (3.6) is obtained, see also Corollary 1. In Figure 3.8, the premium’s values
changes according to the different level of the break even premium. Again for the 3rd
biggest company of the Greek insurance market, the premium can be discounted sig-
nificantly when the break even premium is lower, and our approach recommends lower
values when γ = 2, i.e. when it loses bigger part of the market. For all the different
values of break even premiums, the recommended premium is higher than the average
premium, but it is lower when compared to that of Company B. This is a very interest-
ing result as company B and C have common elasticity factors and their volumes are
comparable. Thus, as company C has less contracts compared to company B, it reduces
a little more the recommended premium in order to retake the lost volume. Again for
the positive effect in the company’s reputation to the volume of business b1 < 0 and
b2 > 0, and it can be also shown that zero positive solutions for the polynomial (3.6)
is derived. Thus, the senior management of the company can keep the same premium
strategy with the previous year.
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pik 200e 205e 210e 215e 220e 225e 230e 235e 240e
|γk| = 0.5 381,23 389,91 398,55 407,13 415,67 424,15 432,57 440,95 449,27
|γk| = 1 315,15 320,64 326,05 331,37 336,61 341,78 346,87 351,89 356,84
|γk| = 1.5 309,55 314,84 320,04 325,16 330,21 335,17 340,07 344,89 349,65
|γk| = 2 280,44 284,79 289,06 293,26 297,40 301,47 305,47 309,41 313,29
Table 3.10: The premium of insurance company C for sign(γk) = −1, different values
of |γk| and for the break-even premium pik.
Figure 3.9: The premium of insurance company C for sign(γk) = −1, different values
of |γk| and for the break-even premium pik.
70
Chapter 4
Calculation of fair premium
4.1 Motivation
The premium-reserve (P-R) process for non-life products is always a very challenging
task in the insurance industry as the actuarial team needs to consider the various
characteristics of the insured object, the potential demand from the policy holders, the
available information about the competition of the targeted market and the reserve that
must be kept. Thus, the main data source on which premium strategy is formulated is
not only based on the insurance company’s own historical data on policies and claims,
but also supplementary information from external sources. At last but not least, it
should be emphasised that every company’s objective is to minimize the level of the
required reserve. Consequently, the main challenge that a company faces is to set a
fair premium that comes up from a reserve minimization procedure which takes into
account different actuarial and financial parameters as well as the market’s competition.
In real world actuarial applications, a premium principle connects the cost of a
general insurance policy to the moments of the corresponding claim arrival and severity
distributions. Insurers add a loading to this cost price in order to make profit and
cover their expenses. After this consideration, two main questions are raised; ”How
an optimal premium can be calculated in order to minimize the level of the required
reserve?” and ”how it is possible to find a premium strategy that takes into consideration
market’s competition and all the different economic parameters that affect company’s
reserve except for the cost of a general insurance policy?”.
A usual approach concerning non-life insurance pricing is the use of Generalized
Linear Models (GLM). A number of key ratios are dependent on a set of rating factors;
see [60]. For personal lines insurance which are designed to be sold in large quantities,
the key ratios are often claim frequency and severity (cost per claim), while for commer-
cial lines insurance which are designed for relatively small legal entities, the loss ratio
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may be also considered (claim costs per earned premium). Rating factors are grouped
into classes (i.e. factor variables) and may include information about policyholder, the
insured risk as well as geographic and demographic information.
4.2 New approach: Demand for a Nonlinear Optimal Con-
trol Framework
In chapter 2 and 3, the disturbance of the volume of business function denotes the set of
all other stochastic variables that are considered to be relevant to the demand function
(moreover, they are assumed to be independently distributed in time and Gaussian).
However, this significant function should also be consisted by many other micro-macro
economic factors that affect the company’s volume of business and consequently, the
optimal premium strategy. Thus, a more thoughtful analysis of this real world in-
surance problem demands that the volume of business to be modelled as a nonlinear
function with respect to reserve, the premium, the noise and a quadratic performance
criterion concerning the utility function to be implemented. Indeed, there are quite
a few examples that nonlinear analysis to model different insurance’s applications is
required, see for instance [47, 48] and [25].
First, let us continue with some arguments about the choice of a quadratic minimiza-
tion problem. Indeed, quadratic forms are the next simplest functions after linear ones.
Like linear functions, they have a matrix representation, so that studying quadratic
forms reduces to studying symmetric matrices. Additionally, the second order condition
that distinguish maxima from minima in economic optimization problems are stated in
terms of a quadratic form. It should be mentioned that several well known economic
problems are modelled using quadratic objective functions, such as the risk minimiza-
tion problems in finance, where riskiness is measured by the (quadratic) variance of
the returns from investments etc.; see [70, 69]. Concerning insurance’s application, Lai
[52] uses a quadratic utility function to find the sufficient conditions on the insurance
premium and deductible to increase the production for a risk-averse firm.
Giving another dimension to chapters’ 2 and 3 models, in the present paper the vol-
ume of business in year k is not only proportional to the ratio of the market’s average
and company’s premium, but it is also related to a function of the form fk(Rk, p˜k, θk),
where Fk(Rk, p˜k) , E[f2k (Rk, p˜k, θk)]. As it will be clearer in the next section, the func-
tion Fk(Rk, p˜k) consists of micro-macro economic parameters which, are implemented
in a competitive P-R model. These are the income insurance elasticity of demand,
the numbers of insured and the inflation in addition to the fame of company. Since,
it is not straightforward to define completely the function fk(Rk, p˜k, θk) because of its
stochastic property, a rational approach is given by the function Fk(Rk, p˜k).
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Thus, the main contribution of this chapter can be highlighted on the following key
points. First, an optimal quadratic control model for the determination of the P-R
strategy is developed as a minimization problem in a nonlinear framework for the very
first time according to the author’s knowledge. In this approach, the present value of
the company’s reserve is required to be close to zero. Second, the stochastic function
fk(Rk, p˜k, θk) that affects the company’s reserve is analysed considering different micro-
macro economic parameters, which directly or indirectly affect the optimal premium.
Finally, as in chapter 2 and 3, the insurance premium is given dynamically and includes
a good number of interesting and very informative parameters about the competition
of the market.
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.3, a nonlinear model in discrete-
time for the P-R strategy of an insurance market is constructed. The utility and
the reserve functions are discussed and the main model’s assumptions as well as their
necessary economic interpretation are provided. In Section 4.4, the calculation of the
optimal premium is derived which is presented using two Theorems. Additionally,
in this section, some special cases of the function fk(Rk,p˜k, θk) are presented. The
discussion of the main results is given in Section 4.5. Then, Section 4.6 presents a
numerical application to illustrate further the theoretical findings of the chapter.
4.3 Model Formulation
4.3.1 Utility and Reserve Function
Borch [6, 7] and Gerber and Pafumi [28] show the importance of the utility theory to
formulate and model some real world problems that were relevant to insurance industry.
Following Von Neuman and Morgenstern [75], who argue that the existence of a utility
function can derive from a set of axioms governing a preference ordering, thus our
suggested reserve utility function has the following two basic properties:
(a) U(Rk) is a decreasing function of reserve Rk.
(b) U(Rk) is a convex function of Rk.
The first property deals with the required evidence that less reserve is better, which
is a reasonable target for every insurance company. One way to justify the second
property is to require the marginal utility U(Rk) to be an increasing function of reserve
Rk or equivalently, that the gain of utility resulting from a premium gain of g, U(Rk +
g) − U(Rk) to be an increasing function of the reserve. The utility function which
is proposed is equal to the sum of the present value of company’s reserve from the
starting year which is equal to zero till year N − 1 times 12 plus the present value of
the company’s reserve in year N times 12 .
In a linear framework, we can denote the process Rk as the insurer’s reserve at time
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[k, k + 1) which is given by:
Rk+1 = −akRk + (pk − pik)Vk, (4.1)
where ak ∈ [0, 1] denotes the excess return on capital (i.e. return on capital required by
the shareholders of the insurer whose strategy is under consideration). Thus, −akRk
is the cost of holding Rk in the time interval [k, k + 1).
As in [71, 72, 61, 62], the volume of business in year k is assumed to be propor-
tional to the ratio of the market’s average premium to the company’s premium in year
k times the company’s volume of business in the preceding year. Furthermore, the
volume of business is stochastic due to the stochastic parameter θk which is assumed
to be independently distributed in time and not always Gaussian, and indirectly af-
fects the premium and finally the company’s reserve; see also Assumption 2 (see next
sub-section).
Consequently, in this paper, a minimization problem with respect to p˜k =
1
pk
is
considered, where the following quadratic performance criterion is valid,
E/R0
{
N−1∑
k=0
1
2
qkR
2
k +
1
2
qNR
2
N
}
, (4.2)
subject to the stochastic dynamic system of the P-R process
Rk+1 = −akRk +mk + Zkp˜k + sign(fk)fk(Rk, p˜k, θk), (4.3)
where R0 is known, mk = Vk−1pk, Zk = −Vk−1pkpik, Rk, p˜k, θk ∈ R, fk : R × R ×
R → R, qk, qN , αk, Zk and mk ∈ R and sign(fk) = ±1 denotes the way that the
function fk(Rk, p˜k, θk) affects company’s reserve. Since market’s average premium is
stochastic, Zk andmk are also stochastic. In other words E (mk) = Vk−1E (p¯k), E (Zk) =
−Vk−1E (p¯k)pik = −E (mk)pik.
Remark 13. The Eq. (4.3) is an interesting and significant extension of the relevant
equations in [71, 72, 61] and [62] in discrete-time framework. Actually, if fk(Rk, p˜k, θk) is
eliminated completely, then Taylor’s [71], and Pantelous and Passalidou’s [61] simplified
approach is deriving. It should be also emphasised that Taylor [71] is proposing a
nonlinear framework, but instead a linear approach of the wealth (equivalently here, of
the reserve) process is discussed eventually.
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4.3.2 Assumptions
The following assumptions are made:
Assumption 1: fk(Rk, p˜k)
∆
= E [fk(Rk, p˜k, θk)] is zero for all Rk, p˜k ∈ R, k = 0, ..., N −
1. There is no loss of generality to assume that fk(Rk, p˜k)
∆
= 0, because appropriate
choices of −ak, Zk, mk will model any mean value of fk which is linear in Rk, p˜k.
Assumption 2: Fk(Rk, p˜k)
∆
= E
[
f2k (Rk, p˜k, θk)
]
exists and is a general quadratic func-
tion of Rk, p˜k for k = 0, ..., N − 1. Fk(Rk, p˜k) has the following representation
Fk(Rk, p˜k)
∆
= Bk
(
1
2
R2kCk + p˜kγkRk +
1
2
p˜2kMk
)
,
where Bk, Ck,Mk, γk ∈ R.
Remark 14. The income elasticity, Bk, of non-life insurance measures the responsive-
ness of the demand for general insurance contracts to a change in the income of the
people demanding them ceteris paribus (all other factors held constant). Lee et al. [53]
conclude that insurance, like other developed financial services, has grown in quantita-
tive importance as part of the general advancement of financial sectors and that there
is a relationship between non-life insurance premiums and real income. According to
their study, income elasticity of non-life insurance premiums are larger than one.
Remark 15. The inflation, Ck, can change dramatically company’s reserve since in-
flation reflects a reduction in the purchasing power per unit of money or loss of real
value in the medium of exchange and unit of account within the economy. D’ Arcy [13]
finds that both the underwriting profit margin and insurance investment returns are
negatively correlated with the inflation rate during the period 1951-1976. Krivo [51]
determines that although inflation and the underwriting profit margin are not signif-
icantly correlated over the subsequent period 1977-2006, investment returns and the
year-to-year change in underwriting profit margin are both significantly negatively cor-
related with inflation over that period. Lowe and Warren [57] describe the negative
impact of inflation on property-liability insurers’ claim costs, loss reserves and asset
portfolios. They express concern that most current actuaries, underwriters and claim
staff have never experienced severe inflation, so could be slow to adapt to any change
in the economic environment. In other words, property-liability insurers are impacted
by inflation in several ways. The clearest impact is the cost of future claims on current
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policies according to Ahlgrim and D’ Arcy [2].
Remark 16. A critical factor that affects demand for non-life insurance and indirectly
premium and reserve is the number of insureds, Mk, in the market. As new insureds
enter the market this has a direct effect on insurance contracts that insureds are willing
and able to buy. An increase in the number of buyers means that there are more
individual demand curves to add up to get the general insurance demand curve, so
market’s demand increases. An increase in demand shifts the demand curve to the
right so at each premium, the quantity of contracts demand increases. The excess
demand causes the premium to rise and equilibrium is restored at a different point.
Remark 17. As it has been discussed in details in [62], the reputation of the company
affects the product’s demand and consequently the optimal premium as well as the
company’s reserve. The reputation of a business, γk is essential to its survival. The
trust and confidence of the client can have a direct and profound effect on a company’s
bottom line.
Assumption 3: Fk(Rk, p˜k) ≥ 0,∀Rk ∈ R, p˜k ∈ R.
Assumption 3 is necessary (hence not at all restrictive) in order that Fk(Rk, p˜k) be a
covariance function for each Rk, p˜k ∈ R. The optimal control sequence {p˜k} is to be
drawn from sequences of closed loop controllers i.e. of the form p˜k = Dk (Rk) ;Rk ∆=
{R0, R1, ..., Rk} where Dk : R × R → R; k = 0, ..., N − 1. Note that because θk is a
sequence of random variables independently disturbed in time, knowledge of is equiva-
lent to knowledge of Rk so that the sequences of closed loop controllers can be written
p˜k = Dk (Rk) ; k = 0, ..., N − 1.
Assumption 4: There is positive price-elasticity of demand, i.e. if the market as a
whole begins underwriting as a whole begins underwriting at a loss, any attempt by a
particular insurer to maintain profitability will result in a reduction of his volume of
business.
Assumption 5: There is a finite time horizon.
Assumption 6: Demand in year k + 1 is assumed to be proportional to demand in
the preceding year k.
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4.4 Calculation of the Optimal Premium in the P-R Pro-
cess
4.4.1 The Main Result
In this section, the optimal premium, p˜∗k, that the insurance company intends to charge
is calculated by minimizing the expected total utility of the reserve Eq. (4.2) and (4.3)
over a finite time horizon T , and over a choice of strategies p. The next theorem provides
the optimal premium strategy for the finite time horizon minimization problem Eqs.
(4.1) - (4.3), see also [40] and [49]. Let us define first
u˜k = 2V
2
k−1pi
2
kE
(
p¯2k
)
Sk+1 +BkMkSk+1, (4.4)
a˜k = 2akVk−1pikE (p¯k)Sk+1 +BkγkSk+1, (4.5)
m˜k = −2V 2k−1pikE
(
p¯2k
)
Sk+1 − Vk−1pikE (p¯k) dk+1, (4.6)
where
Sk = qk + 2a
2
kSk+1 +BkCkSk+1 − u˜−1k a˜2k, SN = qN , (4.7)
dk = −2akVk−1E (p¯k)Sk+1 − dk+1ak − a˜ku˜−1k m˜k, dN = 0, (4.8)
ek = V
2
k−1E
(
p¯2k
)
Sk+1 + Vk−1E (p¯k) dk+1 + ek+1 −
1
2
u˜−1k m˜
2
k, eN = 0. (4.9)
Theorem 4. Using (4.4)-(4.9) and
u˜k > 0 for all k ∈ {0, ..., N − 1} , (4.10)
the optimal premium strategy is given by
p˜∗k = −
[
a˜kRk + m˜k
u˜k
]
; k = 0, ..., N − 1, (4.11)
and the minimum value is given by
1
2
R20S0 + d0R0 + e0. (4.12)
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Proof. Let us define
Jk (Rk)
∆
= min
pk,...,pN−1
E/Rk
{
N−1∑
i=κ
1
2
R2i qi +
1
2
R2NqN
}
. (4.13)
The optimal performance criterion satisfies Bellman equation
Jk (Rk)
∆
= min
pk,...,pN−1
E/Rk
{
1
2
R2kqk + Jk+1 (Rk+1)
}
,
Jk (Rk)
∆
= min
pk,...,pN−1
{
1
2
R2kqk + E/Rk (Jk+1 (Rk+1))
}
, (4.14)
and JN (RN ) =
1
2R
2
NuN . We now show by induction that
Jk(Rk)
∆
=
1
2
SkR
2
k + dkRk + ek. (4.15)
solves (4.14), by noting that (4.15) is true for k = N , assuming that (4.15) is true for
k + 1 and proving that is true for k. Substituting the assumed expression for into the
right hand side of (4.14) yields
min
pk
{12R2kqk + E/Rk [−akRk − Vk−1pikp¯kp˜k + Vk−1p¯k + sign(fk)fk(Rk,p˜k, θk)]2Sk+1
+E/Rk [−akRk − Vk−1pikp¯kp˜k + Vk−1p¯k + sign(fk)fk(Rk,p˜k, θk)] dk+1 + ek+1}
= min
pk
{12R2kqk + E/Rk [a2kR2k + V 2k−1pi2kp¯2kp˜2k + V 2k−1p¯2k + 2akRkVk−1pikp¯kp˜k
−2akRkVk−1p¯k − 2akRksign(fk)fk(Rk,p˜k, θk)
−2V 2k−1pikp¯2kp˜k − 2Vk−1pikp¯kp˜ksign(fk)fk(Rk,p˜k, θk)
+2Vk−1p¯ksign(fk)fk(Rk,p˜k, θk) + [sign(fk)fk(Rk,p˜k, θk)]2]Sk+1
+E/Rk [−akRk − Vk−1pikp¯kp˜k + Vk−1p¯k + sign(fk)fk(Rk,p˜k, θk)] dk+1 + ek+1}
= min
pk
{12R2kqk + [a2kR2k + V 2k−1pi2kE
(
p¯2k
)
p˜2k + V
2
k−1E
(
p¯2k
)
+2akRkVk−1pikE (p¯k) p˜k − 2akRkVk−1E (p¯k)− 2V 2k−1pikE
(
p¯2k
)
p˜k + E[fk(Rk,p˜k, θk)]2]Sk+1
+ [−akRk − Vk−1pikE (p¯k) p˜k + Vk−1E (p¯k)] dk+1 + ek+1}
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= min
pk
{12R2kqk + a2kR2kSk+1 + V 2k−1pi2kE
(
p¯2k
)
p˜2kSk+1 + V
2
k−1E
(
p¯2k
)
Sk+1
+2akRkVk−1pikE (p¯k) p˜kSk+1 − 2akRkVk−1E (p¯k)Sk+1 − 2V 2k−1pikE
(
p¯2k
)
p˜kSk+1
+Bk
(
1
2R
2
kCk + p˜kγkRk +
1
2 p˜
2
kMk
)
Sk+1
−akRkdk+1 − Vk−1pikE (p¯k) p˜kdk+1 + Vk−1E (p¯k) dk+1 + ek+1}.
(4.16)
Because of (4.10), the control that minimizes (4.16) is given by (4.11). When this is
substituted into (4.16), we obtain
1
2
R2k
[
qk + 2ak
2Sk+1 +BkCkSk+1 − u˜−1k a˜2k
]
+Rk
[−2akVk−1E (p¯k)Sk+1 − dk+1ak − u˜−1k a˜2k]
+
[
V 2k−1E
(
p¯2k
)
Sk+1 + Vk−1E (p¯k) dk+1 + ek+1 −
1
2
u˜−1k m˜
2
k
]
. (4.17)
Using (4.4), (4.5), (4.6) in (4.17) yields the fact that (4.15) is true. Thus, the proof by
induction is complete.
Remark 18. In practice, the optimal premium given by Eq. (4.8), makes really sense
when a˜kRk + m˜k < 0. Indeed, the inequality is satisfied if the accumulated reserve
retains small, which is actually the main output of the control process. Otherwise,
if the inequality is not satisfied, then the previous year premium is considered as the
desirable one, and no further changes are suggested, see [61].
Remark 19. In [40], Theorem 5 shows that under certain conditions the inequality
(4.11) is satisfied. Similar result could be implied here and is presented in theorem 5.
The next theorem shows that under certain reasonable conditions inequality (4.11)
is satisfied.
Theorem 5. Suppose that qN ≥ 0 and that qk0 for all k = 0, ..., N − 1, then u˜k > 0
and
Sk+1 > 0; k = 0, ..., N − 1. (4.18)
Proof. We prove this by induction. First we note that because of Assumption 3 and
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the equation Fk(Rk, p˜k) which is mentioned in Assumption 2 we have BkMkSk+1 ≥ 0,
if
Sk+1 ≥ 0. (4.19)
Now we proceed by induction. Clearly we have u˜N−1 > 0 and SN ≥ 0. We now assume
Si ≥ 0,i = k + 1, ..., N. (4.20)
which implies
u˜i−1 > 0,i = k + 1, ..., N. (4.21)
Because Sk+1 > 0 it follows from (4.19) and (4.4) that u˜k > 0.
This, by virtue of (4.7), permits the computation of Sk, dk, ek and (4.15) yields
Jk(Rk) =
1
2
R2kSk + dkRk + ek = maxpk,...,pN−1
E/Rk
{
N−1∑
i=κ
1
2
R2i qi +
1
2
R2NqN
}
. (4.22)
Now because of our assumption on qN , qk; k = 0, ..., N − 1 the right-hand side of (4.22)
is non-negative for all wk which implies Sk > 0 and hence it follows from (4.19) and
(4.4) that u˜k−1 > 0 so that (4.20), (4.21) are true for i = k, ..., N and the proof by
induction is complete.
4.4.2 Three Special Cases
In the previous subsection, a minimization problem using a quadratic performance
criterion (4.2) is considered for the nonlinear wealth function (4.3), where fk(Rk, p˜k, θk)
is not defined explicitly; instead the function Fk(Rk, p˜k) is formulated. In this sub-
section, three cases of the function fk(Rk, p˜k, θk) are presented.
-Standard Linear-Quadratic Case
Assume that
fk(Rk, p˜k, θk) = ∆kθk, ∆k ∈ R, (4.23)
with E [θk] = 0, E
[
θ2k
]
= Λk. In this case Fk(Rk, p˜k) = Λk∆
2
k, ∀Rk, p˜k, k and the opti-
mal premium is independent of Λk∆
2
k. This is the simplest case that can be considered
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explicitly, where the company’s reserve function (4.3) is affected by the stochastic pa-
rameter θk times the factor ∆k. As we have mentioned earlier, θk denotes the set of
all other stochastic variables and it is also considered to be relevant to the company’s
demand function and it is indirectly connected to the company’s reserve function. ∆k
measures the impact that the parameter has to the reserve function through the de-
mand function. Since all the other parameters of the reserve function are known, the
factor ∆kθk can be calculated and further analysed. In this special case the optimal
premium strategy is given by Eq. (4.11), where
u˜k = 2V
2
k−1pi
2
kE
(
p¯2k
)
Sk+1, a˜k = 2akVk−1pikE (p¯k)Sk+1,
Sk = qk + 2a
2
kSk+1 − u˜−1k a˜2k, SN = qN ,
and m˜k is given by Eq. 4.6 all the other parameters are the same as in Theorem 4.
-Norm Dependent Random Vector
Assume now that
Rk+1 = −akRk + Zkp˜k +mk +
(
1
2
C1R
2
k + γ1p˜kRk +
1
2
M1p˜
2
k
)1/2
∆kθk, (4.24)
where C1 ≥ 0. The the number of consumers, respectively. Here, these three factors
are constant for the whole duration, and they are also multiplied by the stochastic
parameter θk (E [θk] = 0, E
[
θ2k
]
= Λk) and the factor ∆k. Indeed, the inflation rate
can change dramatically company’s reserve as it reflects the reduction of the purchasing
power per unit of money or loss of real value in the medium of exchange and unit
of account within the economy. Furthermore, company’s reputation has an impact
on both company’s reserve and premium, and finally the number of the consumers
directly affects company’s demand and indirectly premium. Again, since all the other
parameters of the reserve function are known, the factor ∆kθk can be calculated and
further analysed. Note that if C1 = 1, γ1 = M1 = 0 we have noise ∆kθk multiplied by
‖Rk‖. Equation (4.24) is nonlinear,
fk(Rk, p˜k) = 0 and Fk(Rk, p˜k) =
(
1
2C1R
2
k + γ1p˜kRk +
1
2M1p˜
2
k
)
Λk∆
2
k.
In this special case the optimal premium strategy is given by Eq. (4.11), where
u˜k
∆
= 2V 2k−1pi
2
kE
(
p¯2k
)
Sk+1 +M1Λk∆
2
k,
a˜k
∆
= 2akVk−1pikE (p¯k)Sk+1 + γ1Λk∆2kSk+1,
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Sk = qk + 2a
2
kSk+1 + C1Λk∆
2
k − u˜−1k a˜2k, SN = qN ,
and m˜k is given by Eq. (4.3) all the other parameters are the same as in Theorem 4.
-Random Vector Dependent Upon Absolute Value of Linear Combination
of Rk & p˜k
Finally, assume that
Rk+1 = −akRk + Zkp˜k +mk + |NkRk + hkp˜k|∆kθk, (4.25)
where Nk and hk denote the financial risk that the market confronts and the future
expectations of the insured in time [k, k+1], respectively; see [56], [5], [68], [39], [53, 54].
Again the statistics of θk are E [θk] = 0, E
[
θ2k
]
= Λk. Thus, in this case
fk(Rk, p˜k, θk) = |NkRk + hkp˜k|∆kθk.
Here, the absolute value of this factor is used as Γkθk takes either positive or negative
values. As all the other parameters of the reserve function are known, the factor
Γkθk can be calculated and further analysed. Note that (3.23) includes, if p˜k ∈ R,
Rk+1 = −akRk + Zkp˜k + mk + |p˜k|∆kθk. Again it is easy to see that (3.23) satisfies
our assumptions and
fk(Rk, p˜k) = 0 and Fk(Rk, p˜k) = |NkRk + hkp˜k|Λk∆2k.
Remark 20. Another variable that affects reserve process and the premium is the
financial risk, Nk, of the market. Studies have documented a correlation between finan-
cial development and the development of the insurance market. Lorent [56] indicates
that insurance and banking are increasingly intricate and Billio et al. [5] also show
that the insurance sector has over time become highly interrelated with other sectors
in financial system such as banks, hedge funds etc. due to the involvement of insurance
companies in non-core activities such as credit defaults swaps, derivatives trading and
investment management. Nevertheless, it is essential to notice that individuals and
corporations affront insurable and uninsurable risks in the non-life insurance market;
see, for instance, [68] and [39]. Particularly, Lee et al. [53, 54] study the impact of
country risks, including political, financial and economic risks, on the income elasticity
of insurance demand and conclude that there is a significant effect between them. In
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other words, these risks affect the company’s premium-reserve strategy through the
income elasticity of insurance demand. Insurance exists because of risks, and therefore
risks and insurance are highly correlated.
Remark 21. Finally, the future expectation of consumers, hk, concerning the premi-
ums can also affect how many contracts one is willing and able to buy. The expectations
that buyers have, concerning the future premium, are assumed constant when a demand
curve is constructed. Clients’ expectations are one of the five demand determinants that
shift the demand curve when they change. It is important to realize that buyers make
decisions based on a comparison of current and future premiums. They are motivated
to purchase a non-life insurance contract at the lowest possible price. If that lowest
price is the one existing today, then they will buy today. If that lowest price is expected
to occur in the future, then they will wait until later to buy. Thus, if potential clients
think next month’s premium will be higher than they had initially expected, they may
buy an insurance contract today and not next month. That means that the demand
for general insurance contracts today will increase.
In this special case the optimal premium strategy is given by Eq. (4.11), where
u˜k = 2V
2
k−1pi
2
kE
(
p¯2k
)
Sk+1, a˜k = 2akVk−1pikE (p¯k)Sk+1,
m˜k = −2V 2k−1pikE
(
p¯2k
)
Sk+1 − Vk−1pikE (p¯k) dk+1 + |hk|Λk∆2k,
Sk = qk + 2a
2
kSk+1 − u˜−1k a˜2k, SN = qN ,
dk = −2akVk−1E (p¯k)Sk+1 − dk+1ak |Nk|Λk∆2k − a˜ku˜−1k m˜k.
4.5 Discussion about the Optimal Premium
Initially, it is essential to mention that the optimal premium is calculated based on three
main factors, i.e. u˜k, a˜k, m˜k, which have the three following significant parameters:
• The break-even premium;
• The company’s volume of business of the preceding year;
• The expectation of market’s average premium.
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These factors are also appeared in [61, 62]. The expectation of the market’s average
premium is directly related to the market’s competition, which affects the company’s
premium. Thus, the expectation of market’s average premium is directly related to
the market’s competition which affects company’s premium. Moreover the break-even
premium is directly related to the company’s profitability as well as its reserve and
the volume of business of the preceding year is indicative to the company’s volume of
business and optimal premium as well.
Apart from the parameters mentioned above, one other parameter is also appeared.
This is Sk+1, which is calculated based on the following:
• The present day value factor;
• The market’s inflation;
• The income elasticity of demand.
These economic factors play the most crucial role concerning the company’s reserve on
which optimal premium is depended on. The present day value factor is used to simplify
the calculation for finding the present value of a series of values in the future. It is based
on a discount interest rate and the number of periods. The inflation and the interest
rates are linked, and frequently referenced in macroeconomics. Inflation refers to the
rate at which prices for goods and services rises. In general, as interest rates are lowered,
people are able to borrow more money. The result is that consumers have more money
to spend, causing the economy to grow and inflation to increase. The opposite holds
true for rising interest rates. As interest rates are increased, consumers tend to have
less money to spend. With less spending, the economy slows and inflation decreases.
The income elasticity of demand affects every financial factor of every market and every
business in it since both are related directly or indirectly to the consumer’s income.
These parameters are related to company’s reserve directly since the main difference
between the optimal premium calculated in this paper and the ones mentioned in our
previous papers is that the optimal premium is related directly to the company’s reserve.
Now, the factor a˜k depends also on:
• The excess return of capital i.e. return on capital required by the shareholders of
the insurer whose strategy is under consideration;
• Company’s reputation.
Excess return on capital refers to principal payments back to ”capital owners” (share-
holders, partners, unit holders) that exceeds the growth (net income/taxable income) of
an insurance business or investment. As the financial risk in a market becomes higher
the shareholders probably will ask for a higher excess return of capital. Moreover, firms
with strong positive reputations attract better people. They are perceived as providing
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more value, which often allows them to charge a premium. Their customers are more
loyal and buy broader ranges of products and services. Because the market believes
that such companies will deliver sustained earnings and future growth, they have higher
price-earnings multiples and market values and lower costs of capital.
Another crucial factor is the future expectations of the insured. Buyers make de-
cisions based on a comparison of current and future prices. They are motivated to
purchase an insurance contract at the lowest possible price. If that lowest price is the
one existing today, then they will buy today. If that lowest price is expected to occur in
the future, then they will wait until later to buy. Finally, the optimal premium depends
on the parameter u˜k which calculates on the number of the insured.
Consequently, the main parameters that were appeared to affect the optimal pre-
mium pricing policy in Pantelous and Passalidou [61, 62] continue to be present in the
new optimal premium Eq. (4.11) (i.e. break-even premium, previous year’s volume
and the expectation of the market’s average premium). This equation is also enriched
further with the level of the company’s reserve which affection on the optimal premium
depends on three main parameters mentioned above. Now, the optimal premium de-
pends on many more parameters. Thus, the proposed new optimal premium is getting
closer to reality since it takes into consideration different market’s financial factors,
which affect indirectly the company’s optimal premium strategy.
4.6 Numerical Application
4.6.1 Data
In order to illustrate the main theoretical finding of this paper, a simple numerical
example is presented. Unfortunately, since the real data are not available in public, we
cannot be analytic and, thus, several assumptions for the data have to be implemented.
Consequently, the derived numerical results are subjective and they just illustrate the
applicability of our theoretical findings. The following lines present the main parameters
which are needed for the calculation of the company’s optimal premium according to
the proposed model.
E(p¯k) = 200 e, gk = 0.2, Vk−1 = 5, 000, ak = 0.8, pik = 80 e, dk+1 = 2.1,
V ar(p¯k) = 41, Sk+1 = 0.5, Bk = 1.2, Rk = 720, 000 eand Mk = 106.
4.6.2 Premium Strategy
In this application the expectation of the market’s average premium will be found fol-
lowing one of the suggested average premium strategies. In this strategy, the average
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premium is calculated considering all the competitors of the market, and their propor-
tions regarding to the volume of business. In mathematical terms the expected average
premium of the market is equal to
E (p¯) = 1m
K∑
i=1
bi,npi,n where bi,n = Vi,n
(
K∑
i=1
Vi,n
)−1
and
K∑
i=1
bi,n = 1
for every year n, pi,n is the premium of the company i
th for the year n; K is the number
of the competitors (including also our company’s premium) in the insurance market
and is the number of years for the available data (i.e. we assume that we have the
uniform distribution for the weight of every year).
4.6.3 Numerical Algorithm
Summarizing the discussion in the previous Section, in this sub-section, the algorithmic
steps for the calculation of the optimal premium are described.
Step 1: Collect the necessary (historical) data from the company and the insurance
market.
The first step requires the collection of data concerning company’s volume of business
of the previous year, the excess return of capital, the income elasticity of demand, the
inflation rate, the number of insured, the reputation’s impact to the volume of business
and the variance of market’s average premium.
Step 2: Estimate market’s average premium.
Choose one of the three recommended premium strategies (see also chapter 2) and esti-
mate market’s average premium for each one of the previous years and the expectation
of market’s average premium for the next year, p¯k. As it has been assumed in previous
chapter, the average premium can be calculated either considering the entire market or
considering the leaders of the market or the direct competitors, see eq. (2.17), (2.19)
and (2.21). Then, step 3 follows.
Step 3: Estimate parameters α˜k, m˜k and u˜k.
After collecting the necessary data and estimating the expectation of market’s average
premium the next step is to calculate the parameters α˜k, m˜k and u˜k. If α˜kRk+m˜k > 0,
the previous premium strategy might stay unchanged, since the company already
charges a fair premium. If α˜kRk + m˜k < 0, step 4 follows.
Step 4: Calculate the optimal premium.
Using the estimated parametersα˜k, m˜k and u˜k and the information collected of step
1 the next step is to calculate the optimal premium according to (4.11) for different
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Company’s Reserve Premium
700,000e 181.58e
710,000e 184.94e
720,000e 188.42e
730,000e 192.03e
740,000e 195.79e
Table 4.1: Company’s premium for different levels of reserve in Euros.
values of reserve (Rk) or breakeven premium (pik). Then, step 5 follows.
Step 5: Design the optimal premium strategy for the insurance company.
Now, for different values of the break-even premium pik or different values of reserve
(Rk) the actuary can generate different values for the optimal premium. Then after
taking into consideration the competition in the current (or targeting) insurance mar-
ket and expectation of the different macroeconomic parameters the optimal premium
is calculated and agreed by the senior management of the company.
4.6.4 Numerical Calculation and discussion
After the calculations the optimal premium that comes up is calculated p˜k
∗ = 0.00531
and since p˜k = p
−1
k the optimal premium strategy is equal to pk
∗ = 188.42 e. As it
is mentioned above, an important parameter that affects company’s optimal premium
is company’s reserve. Now, table 4.1 and figure 4.1 present the optimal premium for
different levels of reserve ceteris paribus.
As company’s reserves turns out to be bigger the optimal premium is also getting
bigger. This is quite rational, since companies with bigger reserve tend to charge their
clients a higher premium. On the other hand, companies with a smaller reserve charge
a smaller premium in order to attract more new customers.
Another important parameter that affects the company’s optimal premium is mar-
ket’s competition or in other words market’s average premium. Here, table 4.2 and
figure 4.2 present the optimal premium for different levels of market’s average premium
ceteris paribus. As the market’s average premium turns out to be higher the optimal
premium does getting lower. In other words, the optimal premium is not always follow
market’s swing. In fact, the optimal premium is lower than market’s average premium
till company’s competitive equilibrium point which is 195 eand after this point is lower
than market’s average premium.
Moreover as we have mentioned in the previous chapters, a parameter that affects
significantly company’s optimal premium is the break-even premium. Here, table 4.3
and figure 4.3 present the optimal premium for different levels of break-even premium
ceteris paribus. As the break-even premium turns out to be higher the optimal premium
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Figure 4.1: Company’s premium for different levels of reserve in Euros.
Market’s Average Premium Premium
180.00 e 211.32 e
190.00 e 202.85 e
200.00 e 188.42 e
210.00 e 177.01 e
220.00 e 167.78 e
Table 4.2: Company’s premium for different values of market’s average premium in
Euros.
Figure 4.2: Company’s premium for different values of market’s average premium in
Euros.
is getting higher. From this table it is obvious that the optimal premium is very elastic
to a change in the breakeven premium.
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Break-even Premium Premium
80.00 e 167.78 e
90.00 e 188,75 e
100.00 e 209,73 e
110.00 e 230,70 e
120.00 e 251,67 e
Table 4.3: Company’s premium for different values of break-even premium in Euros.
Figure 4.3: Company’s premium for different values of break-even premium in Euros.
Furthermore, company’s volume of business affects company’s optimal premium.
Here, table 4.4 and figure 4.4 present the optimal premium for different levels of com-
pany’s volume of business ceteris paribus. As volume of business turns out to be higher
the optimal premium is getting lower. In other words, when company has a big volume
of business due to the law of large numbers then it has lower potential claims and can
charge a lower premium.
Moreover, table 4.5 and figure 4.5 present the optimal premium for different levels
of the value αk which denotes the excess return of capital. As αk turns out to be higher
the optimal premium is getting higher. From this table it is obvious that the optimal
premium is not very elastic to a change in αk.
Volume of business Premium
3.500 316,73 e
3.600 292,67 e
3.700 273,05 e
3.800 256,75 e
3.900 242,98 e
Table 4.4: Company’s premium in Euros for different values of volume of business
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Figure 4.4: Company’s premium in Euros for different values of volume of business
Excess return on capital Premium
0.80 167,78 e
0.70 165,99 e
0.60 164,58 e
0.50 163,45 e
0.40 162,51 e
Table 4.5: Company’s premium for different values of excess return of capital in Euros.
Figure 4.5: Company’s premium for different values of excess return of capital in Euros.
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Chapter 5
Further research
As it has been already mentioned, there is not a lot of literature concerning pricing of
general insurance in a competitive market. In the previous chapters three main models
are formulated and solved and analytical solutions have been presented. According to
them, simple but useful numerical algorithms are suggested concerning optimal pre-
mium pricing strategy under different economic parameters and company’s targets.
5.1 Discussion on models’ assumptions and volume of busi-
ness function
As we have already mentioned in chapter 2 and 3, concerning our first and second
model, we make the following assumptions
• There is positive price-elasticity of demand.
• There is a finite time horizon.
• Demand in year k + 1 is assumed to be proportional to demand in the preceding
year k.
• θk affects the volume of business in a linear way (i.e. additive noise).
Considering the previous assumptions several questions are raised. For example if there
is any assumption which can be relaxed or changed in order to have a more realistic
approach of the problem. The first assumption is that there is a positive price-elasticity
of demand ie. if the market as a whole begins underwriting at a loss, any attempt by
a particular insurer to maintain profitability will result in a reduction of his volume
of business. Price elasticity of demand is a measure used in economics to show the
responsiveness, or elasticity, of the quantity demanded of a good or service to a change
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in its price, ceteris paribus (i.e. holding constant all the other determinants of demand).
More precisely, it gives the percentage change in quantity demanded in response to a
one percent change in price.
The first assumption can be changed into there is either negative or positive price-
elasticity of demand i.e. if the market as a whole begins underwriting at a loss, any
attempt by a particular insurer to maintain profitability will not result necessarily in
a reduction of his volume of business.
The third assumption is that the demand in year k+1 is assumed to be proportional
to demand in the preceding year k. Obviously there must be a direct connection
between the demand of two successive years but this connection must not be necessary
proportional times the ratio of the market’s average premium to company’s premium.
One suggestion will be that demand in year k + 1 is assumed to affect the demand of
the preceding year in a linear way. Moreover, the fourth assumption can be changed.
More specific, θk can affect the volume of business in a proportional way.
Under these new assumptions the volume of business function can take the following
formulation
Vk =
p¯k
pk
θk ± Vk−1, (5.1)
where θk is again a stochastic parameter and measures the affection of the ratio average
premium to company’s premium, to company’s volume of business of the preceding year
plus or minus company’s volume of business of the previous year.
Since the assumptions in chapter 3 and 2 are the same and under the considerations
that have been just presented the recommended volume of business in chapter 3 can
be changed into the following
Vk =
(
p¯k
pk
)a
eθk + sign(γk)|γk|βVk−1. (5.2)
Here the volume of business of the preceding year is directly connecting to company’s
reputation which can either be positive or negative and the stochastic parameter θk can
take either positive or negative values and weights the competition’s affection (ratio of
market’s average premium to company’s premium) to the volume of business.
In chapter 4 new assumptions enrich our model. According to the first assumption
of chapter 4 fk(Rk, p˜k)
∆
= E [fk(Rk, p˜k, θk)] is zero for all Rk, p˜k ∈ R, k = 0, ..., N − 1.
There is no loss of generality assuming this but in a wider approach the E [fk(Rk, p˜k, θk)]
could be a linear combination of the function’s factor i.e.
E [fk(Rk, p˜k, θk)] = AkRkp˜k + Bkp˜kθk + ΓkRkθk. (5.3)
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It would be very interesting to explore the meaning and amount of the factors Ak,Bk,Γk
in order to have a more complete understanding of the model.
Additionally, following the second assumption Fk(Rk, p˜k)
∆
= E
[
f2k (Rk, p˜k, θk)
]
ex-
ists, is a general quadratic function of Rk, p˜k for k = 0, ..., N − 1. Fk(Rk, p˜k) and
has the following representation Fk(Rk, p˜k)
∆
= Bk
(
1
2R
2
kCk + p˜kgkRk +
1
2 p˜
2
kMk
)
, where
Bk, Ck,Mk, gk ∈ R. More elements can enrich the equation Fk(Rk, p˜k) i.e.
Fk(Rk, p˜k)
∆
= Bk
(
1
2
R2kCk + p˜kgkRk +
1
2
p˜2kMk + ∆kRk + Ekp˜k
)
. (5.4)
The third assumption must be maintained Fk(Rk, p˜k) ≥ 0,∀Rk ∈ R, p˜k ∈ R in order to
Fk(Rk, p˜k) be a covariance matrix.
Concerning the volume of business function, following Emms [19] the change in
exposure is split up into the lost due to policy termination and that gained due to new
business (or renewals) and entered the parameter n which denotes the rate of generation
of new business and is equal to
n = qG (p/p¯) ,
where G is a non-negative demand function. This parameterisation reflects the idea
that the reputation of a company is proportional to its exposure in the market and that
it is the reputation of an insurer which partially increases its likelihood to generate new
business. New business generation is also determined by the premium that the insurer
sets relative to the market, which is represented by the demand function G.
Adjusting this main idea to our volume of business function in discrete time, we
can assume that the rate of generation of new business is equal to
nk = VkG (pk/p¯k) , (5.5)
which relates the rate of generation of new business with the volume of business and
ratio of company’s premium to market’s average premium.
In addition the volume of business following Emms [19] may assumed to be equal
to
Vk = nk − ξVk−1, (5.6)
where ξVk−1 is equal to the loss of exposure due to policy termination (and not renewal).
5.2 Discussion on utility function
In chapter 2 and 3 the utility function is the present value of wealth U(wk, k) = υ
kwk.
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Many different alternatives are for the utility functions.
One simple case is the logarithmic form of u favored by Bernoulli, which can be
written as
u(w) = log (1 + cw) , (5.7)
for positive constant c.Bernoulli argued for (5.7) with an early expression of the law
of diminishing marginal utility which says that the increment of utility for the next
bit of wealth ought to be inversely proportional to the amount of wealth prior to the
incremental increase.
Another utility function that could be used to extend our model is von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function with the following representation
u (w) = aw − be−cw, (5.8)
for constants a ≥ 0, b, c > 0. This utility function is not only increasing (u′ > 0) but
also risk averse (u
′′
< 0).
Moreover, a utility function that can be used is a quadratic one
u (w) = aw2 + bw, (5.9)
with a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0 and a+ b > 0 to satisfy the assumption that more wealth is preferred
to less (for constant a and b) which can be also expressed as x  y when x > y ≥ 0.If
wealth were unbounded below, with x  y ⇔ x > y, then the quadratic case would
reduce to the linear case of u (w) = w because any nonzero a would violate monotonicity.
An alternative proposition for the utility function is an exponential utility
u (w) = 1− e−aw, (5.10)
with coefficient of absolute risk aversion A(w) = a or
U (w) =
1− γ
γ
(
aW
1− γ + b
)γ
, (5.11)
with a > 0 and b+ aW1−γ > 0.
Concerning the utility function of company’s reserve which is presented in chapter
4 the utility function could be equal to
E/w0
{
N−1
Σ
k=0
1
2
(
wTkQkwk + p˜
T
k Γkp˜k
)
+
1
2
wTNQNwN
}
, (5.12)
where Γk denotes the marginal utility of insurance contracts in year [k, k+1). In order to
calculate a fair premium company’s reserve must be minimized but the marginal utility
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of insurance contracts must be maximized. In other words a min-max optimization
problem must be solved.
5.3 Discussion on models’ wealth function
5.3.1 Wealth’s risk investement
In chapter 2 and 3 the company’s wealth function is equal to
wk+1 = −αkwk + (pk − pik)Vk,
where αk is the excess return of capital required by shareholder etc.
If the company chooses to invest the rest of its wealth to a portofolio with different
investing products with a positive or zero return income then the wealth function will
have the following representation
wk+1 = −akwk1 + (1− ak)wk2Ik + (pk − pik)Vk (5.13)
where wk1 + wk2 = wk and Ik is the return of the investment of the wk2 which is not
risk free and could be either zero or positive and is a stochastic variable.
5.3.2 Direct connection between company’s wealth and claims
According to Emms [20] the breakeven premium pit (per unit exposure) is related to
the mean claim size rate us
pit = E
 t+τ∫
t
usds/Ft
 ,
and the wealth process is equal to
dwt = −awtdt+ qt (G (kt) pt − ut) dt,
where the rate of increase in exposure caused by new business and renewals is qtG (kt, t)
and G (kt, t) is the demand for insurance of relative price kt at time t.
One suggesting wealth function concerning our model can be calculated
wk+1 = −akwk + Vk
(
Gk
(
pk
p¯k
)
pk − Ck
)
, (5.14)
where Gk
(
pk
p¯k
)
is the demand function of insurance and Ck is the claims for year k.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
Taylor [71, 72] and Emms et al. [17, 18] study fixed premium strategies and the sensitiv-
ity of the model to its parameters involved. In their approach, the important parameters
which determined the optimal strategies are the ratio of initial market average premium
to break-even premium, the measure of the inverse elasticity of the demand function
and the non-dimensional drift of the market average premium. However, the main pur-
pose of our thesis is formulating different volume of business functions incorporating
new economic parameters and calculate a premium which derives straightforward from
company’s and market’s historical data.
In the second chapter, we articulate and answer three main questions. The first one
is ”What is the optimal premium strategy for an individual insurance company and for
a specific portfolio of homogeneous or/and heterogeneous risks?”. The second is ”how
is this related to the competitive market?”; and finally ”how does the volume of business
affect the premium strategy?”.
In order to answer these questions, extending further the ideas proposed by Taylor
[71, 72], Emms Haberman [17] and Emms et al.[18], we develop a model for the
optimal premium pricing policy of a non-life insurance company into a competitive
market environment using elements of dynamic programming into a stochastic, discrete-
time framework when the insurance company is expected to lose part of the market
competition. For that reason, a stochastic demand function for the volume of business
of an insurance company into a discrete-time has been applied according to which
the volume of business is proportional to the volume of business of the presenting year
(past year experience) times the rate market’s average premium to company’s premium
(which is a control function) minus a stochastic parameter θk. Thus, by maximizing
the total expected linear discounted utility of the wealth over a finite time horizon, the
optimal premium strategy is defined analytically and endogenously for E (θk) > µ > 0.
Thus, the optimal controller (i.e. the premium) is defined endogenously by the
market as the company struggles to increase its volume of business into a competitive
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environment with the same characteristics as Taylor [71, 72], Emms and Haberman[17]
, and Emms et al.[18] have used.
Finally, we consider three different strategies for the average premium of the mar-
ket. In the Premium Strategy I, the average premium is calculated considering all the
competitors of the market, and their proportions regarding the volume of business (i.e.
we assume that we have the uniform distribution for the weight of every year). More-
over, in the Premium Strategy II, the average premium is calculated considering the
premiums of the top Ktop competitors of the market (including the leading company
of the market) and finally in Premium Strategy III, the average premium is calcu-
lated considering the premium of company’s direct competitors. The direct competitor
factor is indicative to how the company that though as direct competitor is similar
to our company’s and affect our volume of business. This factor depends mainly on
three other factors which are company’s operational efficiency, product leadership and
customer intimacy.
In chapter 3, we articulate and answer two main questions. The first one is ”how a
company’s optimal strategy can be determined into a general competitive market envi-
ronment” and secondly ”how this strategy is connected to the market’s competition”.
A functional equation for the volume of business is proposed, which relates the com-
pany’s premium with the past year experience, the average premium of the market,
company’s reputation and a stochastic disturbance, and it can be seen as a nice ex-
tension to the ideas proposed in chapter 2. Specifically market’s volume of business is
equal to the volume of business of the preceding year multiplied by the ratio market’s
average premium to company’s premium raised to a factor α plus company’s reputation
raised to a factor β times the natural exponential function of the stochastic parameter
θk. Company’s reputation can either a have positive or negative impact on company’s
volume of business and the sign changes respectively.
Using again a linear discounted function for the company’s wealth an optimal pre-
mium strategy can be investigated which maximizes its present value or minimizes the
present value of the difference between a targeted wealth and the company’s wealth.
Thus, the main results are presented in two interesting theorems. The first theorem
calculates the premium that the insurance company intends to charge by maximizing
the expected total utility of wealth both for negative or positive reputation over a fi-
nite time horizon T and over a choice of strategies p. According to the results of the
second theorem we may not have always find an optimal positive solution. Then the
previous year’s strategy is charectirized as a very successful choice. However we can
also calculate an upper bound for the optimal premium strategy which is presented in
theorem three of the third chapter when the company is targeting a particular wealth
for the finite time horizon and the company tries to minimize the present value of the
difference between a targeted wealth and the company’s wealth when the company has
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positive reputation and α > 0.
Analytical solutions of some special and common cases, for α = 1, 2, 3, are presented
where the optimal premium depends endogenously on the dynamics of the insurance
market. then the optimal premium is given by Finally, an optimal premium strategy is
proposed for the calculation of the markets’ average premium and an application based
on data from the Greek insurance market is presented for a complete understanding
of the model. Market’s average premium values can be represented as a sequence
of correlated pulses or series of events and there is a generic multiplicative process for
market’s average premium which fluctuated due to random perturbations by a sequence
of uncorrelated normally distributed rendom variable with zero expectation and unit
variance.
Indeed, as far as computational techniques are concerned, the proposed process in
this chapter to calculate the optimal premium is not challenging. Firstly, we define the
volume of business function that fits better to our data. Afterwards, with the premium
strategy mentioned above we calculate the expected market’s average premium for the
preceding year using an advanced point process with memory. Then, the polynomial
can be solved and the optimal premium strategy which should be a positive number is
finally derived.
In this chapter, two main questions are trying to be answered ”How an optimal
premium can be calculated in order to minimize the level of the required reserve?” and
”how it is possible to find a premium strategy that takes into consideration market’s
competition and all the different economic parameters that affect company’s reserve
except for the cost of a general insurance policy?”.
For this purpose an optimisation process for the calculation of a fair premium
is described. This topic is of a greatest interest for the practitioners as well as the
whole insurance industry. Analytically, the reserve is considered to be a stochastic
equation which has an additive random nonlinear function of the state, premium and
not necessarily Gaussian noise (θk) which is, however, independently distributed in
time, provided only that the mean value and the covariance of the random function is
zero and a quadratic function of the state, premium and other parameters, respectively.
The new premium does not only capture the break-even premium, the company’s
volume of business of the preceding year, the expectation of market’s average premium
as it did in the linear models, but also the income insurance elasticity of demand, the
number of consumers, the inflation in addition to the company’s reputation. Finally,
the derived optimal premium depends on the company’s reserve as well as the other
already mentioned above factors.
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